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NOTES
How Exclusive Is the Workers’ Compensation Exclusive
Remedy? 2010 Amendments to Oklahoma Workers’
Compensation Statute Shoot Down Parret
I. Introduction
Workers’ compensation generally provides the exclusive remedy for
injured employees.1 That is, employees injured on the job must pursue their
claims against their employers through the workers’ compensation system
rather than through the traditional common law court system in which
plaintiffs ordinarily pursue tort claims. Not only are injured employees
jurisdictionally limited to the workers’ compensation courts in pursuing
claims against employers, their recovery for personal injuries sustained on
the job is also limited to the relief afforded them through the workers’
compensation system—thus the determination of liability is also exclusive.
The workers’ compensation exclusive remedy limitation developed
through a delicate legislative compromise in response to competing public
policy concerns.2 In this compromise, “both the employer and the
employee relinquished certain rights to obtain other advantages.”3 When an
employer intentionally injures an employee, however, the public policy
rationale motivating workers’ compensation exclusivity is weakened. In
fact, many states have recognized an exception to the exclusive remedy
limitation if the employer intentionally injures the employee.4 In those
situations, the employee’s remedy is not limited to those available under the
workers’ compensation system.5 Instead, the employee may choose to
pursue his or her claim either through the workers’ compensation system or
through the traditional common law court system.6
Now that the door allowing an exception to the workers’ compensation
exclusive remedy has been opened for an employer’s intentional
misconduct, the debate regarding how to define intent for purposes of this
exception is raging in state courts and legislatures across the country.7 Two
1. See, e.g., 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302 (2011).
2. See Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(quoting Wagner v. Nat’l Indem. Co., 422 A.2d 1061, 1065 (Pa. 1980)).
3. See id.
4. See Appendix.
5. See, e.g., 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302.
6. See, e.g., id.
7. See Appendix.
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primary definitions of intent compete for acceptance: (1) purpose to cause
injury and (2) knowledge of the substantial certainty of injury.8 Behind this
conflict is the public policy question of what weight to give the rights of
injured employees to workplace safety and automatic compensation versus
employers’ interests in limited and foreseeable liability.
In the most recent legislative session, Oklahoma’s legislature
authoritatively weighed in on the debate, defining “intent” for purposes of
the exclusivity provision as the “willful, deliberate, specific intent of the
employer to cause such injury.”9 In so doing, the Oklahoma legislature
effectively overturned the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision Parret v.
UNICCO Service Co. In Parret, the court adopted a broader definition of
intent than the current statutory formulation, holding that intent includes:
(1) purpose to injure and (2) knowledge of the substantial certainty of
injury.10
Part II of this note discusses the historical context in which workers’
compensation laws developed and the policies motivating these laws. Part
III explains the two competing standards for intent-based exceptions to
workers’ compensation exclusivity and analyzes how courts have applied
the two standards. Part IV explores Oklahoma’s approach to defining
intent. This part begins by tracing the evolution of the intentional tort
exception in pre-Parret cases, continues with a thorough analysis of the
Parret decision and Parret’s application in subsequent cases, and concludes
with an overview of the legislature’s 2010 response as manifested in the
amended statute. Part V analyzes the competing standards in light of the
policies motivating workers’ compensation law.
Considering these
policies, this part argues that the Oklahoma legislature adopted the proper
standard of intent—purpose to injure. Part VI briefly summarizes and
concludes.
II. Historical Context Motivating Workers’ Compensation Statutes and
Oklahoma’s Codification of Workers’ Compensation
A. An Industrial Bargain Between Employers and Employees
The socio-economic climate of America at the turn of the twentieth
century demanded legislation to protect workers.11 As the United States
8. See Davis v. CMS Cont’l Natural Gas, Inc., 23 P.3d 288, 294 (Okla. 2001).
9. 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302.
10. See Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 579 (Okla. 2005), superseded by
statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33.
11. Id. at 577-78.
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rapidly industrialized, workplace injuries skyrocketed.12 At the same time,
employees could not recover for these injuries against their employers
because common law defenses such as assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, and the fellow servant doctrine shielded employers from
liability.13 The injuries workers sustained frequently resulted in permanent
disability.14 As a result, the injured employee—often his family’s sole
breadwinner—could not earn a living, leaving his family destitute.15
Workers’ compensation statutes, first enacted in 1908 and now adopted
in every state, emerged to address this problem.16 These statutes are
primarily designed to prevent injured workers and their families from
falling into destitution.17 Workers’ compensation benefits provide injured
employees and their families a modest living and “prevent them from
Initially, these statutes covered only
becoming public charges.”18
employees in ultra-hazardous occupations; however, today, workers’
compensation has been expanded to cover workers in nearly every
occupation.19
To achieve these purposes, an “industrial bargain” was imposed upon
injured employees and their employers.20 Employees “gave up the right to
bring a common law negligence action against the employer.”21 In return,
employees received automatic benefits irrespective of the employer’s
fault.22 These guaranteed benefits reduced the costs, delay, and uncertainty
of litigation, providing employees with a “swift and certain” recovery.23
Employers, on the other hand, gave up common law defenses such as
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant
doctrine. Historically, when asserted, the fellow servant doctrine entirely

12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See id; see also 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 2.08
(rev. ed. 2011) (“[I]n 1963, the last state, Hawaii, came under the system.”).
17. Parret, 127 P.3d at 577-78.
18. Id. (quoting Corbin v. Wilkinson, 53 P.2d 45, 48 (Or. 1935)).
19. See 1 LARSON, supra note 16, § 2.07 (“All but one [state], Wyoming, have since
broadened their scope.”); see also Ragsdale v. Wheelabrator Clean Water Sys., Inc., 959
P.2d 20, 22 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998).
20. Parret, 127 P.3d at 578.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Copass v. Ill. Power Co., 569 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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denied the injured employee’s recovery.24 In return for relinquishment of
common law defenses, the employer “received reduced exposure to
liability”25 as the employer’s liability under workers’ compensation
schemes is both “limited and determinate.”26
B. How Workers’ Compensation Works
The hallmark of workers’ compensation is the employee’s automatic
entitlement to predetermined benefits if the employee “suffers a ‘personal
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.’”27
Types of compensable injuries, unlike tort, are limited to those “which
either actually or presumptively produce disability and thereby presumably
affect earning power.”28
In this system, fault proves generally immaterial, both from the
perspective of the employee and the employer. An employee’s contributory
negligence fails to bar or reduce recovery, and an employer’s freedom from
fault does not abrogate or reduce his liability.29 If “an employee
experiences . . . a job related injury, the employer is obligated to make
payments pursuant to the Act”.30
Workers’ compensation benefits are predetermined, based upon the
employee’s: (1) average weekly wage; (2) length of disability (permanent
or temporary); (3) extent of disability (total or partial); and (4) type of
injury.31 Considering these factors, an employee’s cash-wage benefits
generally consist of “one-half to two-thirds of the employee’s average
weekly wage.”32 In addition to the cash-wage benefits, injured employees
are typically also entitled to reimbursement for related medical expenses.33
These benefits are usually subject to “arbitrary maximum and minimum
limits.”34
24. Parret, 127 P.3d at 578.
25. Id.
26. Kittell v. Vt. Weatherboard, Inc., 417 A.2d 926, 927 (Vt. 1980) (quoting Morrisseau
v. Legac, 181 A.2d 53, 57 (1962)).
27. 1 LARSON, supra note 16, § 1.01 (emphasis added).
28. Id. § 1.03(4). For example, workers’ compensation does not provide benefits for
pain and suffering, loss of consortium, or conscious suffering.
29. Id. § 1.01.
30. Edward John Main, Bad Faith in the Workers’ Compensation Context: A Cause in
Search of an Action, 30 TULSA L.J. 507, 509 (1995) (footnote omitted).
31. See, e.g., 85 OKLA. STAT. §§ 331-334 (2011).
32. 1 LARSON, supra note 16, § 1.01.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Ordinarily, administrative commissions oversee the workers’
compensation system.35 Employers are required to secure workers’
compensation liability through “private insurance, state-fund insurance . . .
or self-insurance,” depending on the state.36 The costs of these insurance
premiums are then included in the cost of production and reflected in the
price of the employer’s goods or services, thereby shiftingthe burden of
compensating injured employees from the employer to the consuming
public.37
C. Workers’ Compensation as the Exclusive Remedy
In exchange for guaranteed benefits, the employee relinquishes his
common law right to sue his employer “for damages for any injury covered
by the act.”38 Effectively, workers’ compensation has become the exclusive
remedy for injured employees. The purpose of the exclusivity of the
remedy mirrors that of workers’ compensation generally—to shift “the
burden of all work-related injuries from individual employers and
employees to the consuming public with the concept of fault being virtually
immaterial.”39
Nevertheless, exceptions to workers’ compensation exclusivity have
developed both judicially and legislatively.40 One of these exceptions
allows an employee intentionally injured by his employer to pursue a
common law tort suit for damages against that employer.41
The primary basis for this exception is that an employer’s intentional
torts against an employee fall outside the scope of, and therefore are not
covered by, workers’ compensation. Workers’ compensation guarantees
employees benefits for accidental injuries sustained during the course of
employment. But an employer’s intentional torts against an employee fall
outside this scope for two reasons. First, an employer’s intentional tort “is

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302 (2011) (providing the exclusive remedy “except in
the case of an intentional tort, or where the employer has failed to secure the payment of
compensation for the injured employee” as required by the workers’ compensation statute).
41. See id.
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not accidental and therefore not covered by the act.”42 Second, the
intentional nature of the harm severs the employer-employee relationship.43
Because intentional torts are outside its scope, workers’ compensation
provides no remedy at all for intentional injuries. Accordingly, employees
injured by the intentional torts of their employers should not be subject to
workers’ compensation exclusivity. Instead, these employees should be
allowed to pursue their common law claims for damages against their
employer.
The issue then, becomes how to define intent for purpose of the
intentional torts exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity. States
split between: (1) adopting the more exacting, and therefore more
exclusive, “standard of purpose to cause injury” and (2) adopting the more
liberal, and therefore less exclusive, standard of “knowledge to a substantial
certainty that injury will result.”44
III. The Dueling Standards: Purpose vs. Substantial Certainty
A. Purpose
Outside the workers’ compensation system, two intrinsically different
standards of intent allow an employee to bring a claim against the
employer. The first of those standards of intent is the “purpose” to injure
standard.
1. Overview
The modern view of the intentional tort exception to workers’
compensation exclusivity is that only an employer’s purpose to cause injury
satisfies the requisite standard of intent for the exception to apply.45 Today,
a clear majority of jurisdictions that have an intentional tort exception to
workers’ compensation exclusivity have adopted the purpose standard.46
Courts adopting this standard employ various formulations of the
standard, including: deliberate intent, specific intent, actual intent, and true

42. Van Biene v. Era Helicopters, Inc., 779 P.2d 315, 318 (Alaska 1989) (quoting
Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 43 n.29 (Alaska 1974), overruled on
other grounds, 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976)).
43. Guerrero, 230 S.W.3d at 298 (quoting Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co.,
230 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Ark. 1950)).
44. See Appendix.
45. See Copass v. Ill. Power Co., 569 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
46. See Appendix; see also Van Biene, 779 P.2d at 319.
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intent.47 In all variations, however, each court applying the standard is
describing “purpose” to injure: a person acts with purpose to cause injury
when the person’s conscious object is to cause the injury.48
Many of these jurisdictions have determined that purpose “implies the
formation by the employer of a specific intention to cause injury or death
combined with some action aimed at accomplishing such result, as opposed
to mere employer negligence or gross negligence.”49
Because an employer’s purpose to cause harm is sufficient to bring an
employee’s claim within the intentional tort exception, the employee is not
additionally required to show that injury was substantially certain to
result.50
2. How the Purpose Standard Is Applied
The purpose standard is exacting. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Parret noted that “in any jurisdiction applying the ‘specific intent’ standard,
‘unless the case involves an assault or a battery, recovery will probably be
denied.’”51
As the Parret court observed, an employer’s assault of an employee is
usually sufficient to bring the employee’s claim outside the coverage of
workers’ compensation. For example, in Sitzman v. Schumaker,52 an
employee worked for his employer providing general ranch labor.53
Following an argument, the employer struck the employee several times in
the face.54 The employee responded, pushing the employer to the ground.55
The employer then picked up a four-foot piece of two-inch pipe.56 The
employee asked the employer not to hit him with the pipe, but as the
employee turned to walk away, the employer hit the employee in the back
47. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 503 A.2d 708, 711 (Md.
1986) (using “specific” and “deliberate” intent); Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572,
575 (Okla. 2005), superseded by statute 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33 (recognizing an
exception in many jurisdictions when an employer acts “deliberately and with the actual
intent to cause injury”).
48. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (2010).
49. Johnson, 503 A.2d at 711.
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 1 cmt. c (2010).
51. Parret, 127 P.3d at 575 (quoting 48 AM. JUR. 2d Proof of Facts § 2 (1987)).
52. Sitzman v. Schumaker, 718 P.2d 657 (Mont. 1986).
53. Id. at 658.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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of the head with the pipe.57 As the employee maneuvered to protect
himself, the employer hit him again with the pipe, this time in the front of
the head.58 This final blow cracked the employee’s skull, rendered him
unconscious, and ultimately caused life altering injuries.59
The court held: “The egregiousness of these circumstances removes the
exclusivity bar for an employee.”60 It explained that shielding an employer
from tort liability when he assaults his employee would entirely disregard
the quid pro quo of the industrial bargain between employers and
employees.61 If this were not the case, the employer could effectively
obtain insurance coverage for the right to assault his employees and spread
that cost over other employers who participate in the system.62
Even if an employee alleges employer misconduct that rises to the level
of purpose to injure, however, the employee will likely fail. In the face of
culpable employer conduct, unless the facts clearly show the employer’s
purpose to injure, the employee will fail to satisfy this high standard.
In Davis v. U.S. Employers Council, Inc.,63 for example, an employee
worked as an automobile painter.64 The employee and others repeatedly
informed their employer of severe respiratory symptoms they were
experiencing and complained of inadequate ventilation.65 As a result of
exposure to toxic levels of paint fumes, the employee was diagnosed with
“chronic toxic encephalopathy, with organic brain damage.”66
The court assumed the employer knew that the employee and others had
been exposed to toxic levels of paint fumes and that these fumes were
causing severe respiratory symptoms.67 Furthermore, the court assumed the
employer knew that if it did not provide adequate ventilation, the employee
or “some other similarly situated employee was certain to suffer severe
injury.”68 Notwithstanding this knowledge, the employer allegedly failed to
provide adequate ventilation.69 The employee conceded that the employer,
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id.
Davis v. U.S. Emp’rs Council, Inc., 934 P.2d 1142 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1144.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1146.
Id.
Id.
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in failing to provide the ventilation, was motivated by a desire to save
money.70
Despite the employer’s actual knowledge that a working condition was
causing injury, the court barred the employee’s claim, stating that the sine
qua non of the intentional tort exception is the employer’s purpose to harm
the employee.71 The employee’s acknowledgement that the employer was
motivated by a desire to save money rather than to injure the employee
precluded recovery outside of workers’ compensation.72
B. Substantial Certainty
The second of the two primary intent standards recognized for an
employer’s conduct to fall within the intentional tort exception to workers’
compensation exclusivity is the “substantial certainty” standard.
1. Overview
A significant minority of states now allow an employee to bring a
common law suit outside of the workers compensation system when the
employer was substantially certain an employee would be injured, even if
injury to the employee was not the purpose of the employer.73
The substantial certainty standard proves consistent with the Restatement
(Second) of Tort’s dual definition of intent, which provides that intent
“denote[s] that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or
that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result
from it.”74
To satisfy this standard, an employee need not prove that the employer
acted with purpose to injure the employee; it is sufficient to show that the
employer was substantially certain injury would result.75 The substantial
certainty standard is a subjective standard.76 The employer must be
subjectively aware of the substantial certainty of resulting injury; it is not
sufficient that the injury is objectively substantially certain to occur.77
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See Appendix; see also King v. Penrod Drilling Co., 652 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 (D.
Nev. 1987); see, e.g., Jones v. V.I.P. Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1984), superseded by
statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (West 2011).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 1 cmt. c (2010).
76. See id.
77. See id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012

84

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:75

An employee does not carry his burden by demonstrating the employer’s
knowledge of foreseeable risk, a high probability of risk, or even a
substantial likelihood of risk.78 On the other hand, the employee is not
required to demonstrate the employer’s awareness of the actual or virtual
certainty of the injury.79 Instead, the employee must show that the employer
was aware of the substantial certainty of injury to the employee.80
2. How the Substantial Certainty Standard Is Applied
Cases in which courts have applied the substantial certainty standard to
allow a common law tort claim have generally involved “a localized jobsite hazard, which threatens harm to a small number of identifiable
employees during a relatively limited period of time.”81 The substantial
certainty standard “loses its persuasiveness when the identity of potential
victims becomes vaguer and when, in a related way, the time frame
involving the actor’s conduct expands and the causal sequence connecting
conduct and harm becomes more complex.”82
To illustrate this point, the Restatement (Third) of Torts provides two
contrasting examples. In the first scenario, a land developer constructing a
high-rise building “can confidently predict that some number of workers
will be seriously injured in the course of the construction project.”83
Despite the developer’s knowledge, the owner is guilty of neither an
intentional tort nor even negligence.84
In the second scenario, an employer provides a machine lacking adequate
safety guards to its employees.85 The employer knows that employees use
this machine and that over time, an employee is substantially certain to be
injured.86 Courts applying the substantial certainty standard generally find
this type of action satisfies the standard and exempts the employee’s claim
from workers’ compensation exclusivity.87
78. Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 579 (Okla. 2005), superseded by
statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33.
79. Sorban v. Sterling Eng’g Corp., 830 A.2d 372, 379 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 1 cmt. c.
81. Id. § 1 cmt. e.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 1 reporter’s note to cmt. e (citing Rose v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 472
S.E.2d 774 (N.C. 1996)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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In Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,88 a New Jersey case, an
employee sued his employer for: (1) intentionally exposing the employee
to a known danger, asbestos; (2) withholding the nature of that danger from
the employee; and (3) withholding specific information obtained during the
employee’s physical examination which revealed existing injuries caused
by exposure to asbestos.89
As part of the employer’s medical benefits, the employer’s physicians
provided employees with routine physical examinations.90 Although chest
x-rays taken during one of these physical examinations revealed asbestosrelated injuries, the physicians failed to inform the employee of the
injuries.91 The employee alleged this concealment was part of a concerted
corporate plan to prevent employees from leaving the workforce.92 As a
result of both the initial exposure to asbestos and this concealment of
existing injuries, the employee suffered severe and irreversible injury.93
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the employee’s claim based
upon the initial exposure to asbestos in the workplace was barred by
workers’ compensation exclusivity.94 The court, however, applying the
substantial certainty standard, allowed the tort claim for aggravation of
existing injuries caused by the fraudulent concealment of the existing
injuries.95 The court explained that there “is a difference between . . .
tolerating . . . conditions that will result in a certain number of injuries . . .
and . . . actively misleading the employees who have already fallen victim
to those risks”96, finding that the concealment of existing known injuries is
outside the industrial bargain struck between employers and employees and
is beyond the scope of tort liability from which the legislature intended to
exempt the employer.97
Similar to Davis v. U.S. Employers Council, Inc., the employee in
Millison acknowledged that the employer concealed the existing injury to
prevent the employee and others from leaving the workforce rather than out

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

501 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1985).
See id. at 508.
Id. at 516.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 519.
See id. at 514, 516.
Id. at 516.
Id.
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of a desire to injure the employee.98 Had the court applied the purpose
standard as in Davis, the employee’s claim for fraudulent concealment
likely would have been barred as was the employee’s claim in Davis.99
While a minority of states will allow plaintiffs relief upon a showing of
substantial certainty, mere negligence is not sufficient to justify that relief.
For example, in Jensen v. Sport Bowl, Inc.,100 a fourteen-year-old employee
worked for a bowling alley as a pinchaser.101 The young employee’s job
responsibilities included wiping oil from the automatic pinsetting
machines.102 One night, the employee’s right index finger was severed
when a rag he was using to clean the automatic pinsetting machine got
stuck in a moving pulley.103 The employee filed a tort claim against his
employer, alleging that the employer was substantially certain that injury
would result.104
The court, viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to the
employee, determined that the employee “was an inexperienced,
inadequately trained, 14-year-old boy ordered by his employer, without any
warning of the danger, to perform a maintenance task which the employer
knew from personal experience to be risky.”105 The court held, however,
that even though the boy’s employment violated child labor regulations and
even though the employer knew the assigned task was risky, the alleged
facts did not demonstrate the employer was substantially certain that injury
would result.106 Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the employer.107
IV. Oklahoma’s Approach to Defining Intent for Purposes of the Exception
to the Exclusivity Provision of Workers’ Compensation
The Oklahoma Worker’s Compensation Act delineates the rights of an
employee to recover from his employer for an on-the-job injury. An
employer subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act must:
98.
1997).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id.; Davis v. U.S. Emp’rs Council, Inc., 934 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Or. Ct. App.
See Davis, 934 P.2d at 1146.
469 N.W.2d 370 (S.D. 1991).
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 372.
Id.
See id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss1/3

2012]

NOTES

87

pay or provide benefits according to the provisions of this act for
the accidental injury or death of an employee arising out of and
in the course of his or her employment, without regard to fault
for such injury, if the employee's contract of employment was
made or if the injury occurred within this state.108
Under this statute, employee benefits are automatic and predetermined
based upon the employee’s average weekly wage and the duration, degree,
and type of injury.109 These benefits are exclusive.110
Before the 2010 amendments to the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation
Act, there was not a statutory exception in Oklahoma to the workers’
compensation exclusive remedy provision for intentional injuries. Instead,
the intentional tort exception was judicially constructed.111 Consequently,
there was not a statutory definition of “intent” for this exception.
As the following cases will show, Oklahoma courts struggled to define
the parameters of the intentional tort exception from 1917 through the
Parret v. UNICCO Service Co. case in 2005. Then, in 2010, the Oklahoma
legislature authoritatively weighed in, effectively overturning Parret and
codifying the “purpose to injure” standard.112
A. The Road to Parret v. UNICCO Service Co.: A Survey of Pre-Parret
Decisions
The basis for the intentional tort exception created by Oklahoma case
law is that an employer’s intentional tort against an employee is, by
definition, not accidental.113 Since workers’ compensation covers only
accidental injuries, the act does not cover an employer’s intentional torts
against its employees.114 Because the act does not address an employer’s
intentional torts, the act cannot provide the exclusive remedy.115 Therefore,

108. 85 OKLA. STAT. § 310 (2011).
109. See id. §§ 331-334.
110. See id. § 302.
111. See Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 574 (Okla. 2005), superseded by
statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33.
112. 85 OKLA. STAT. § 12 (Supp. 2010).
113. See Roberts v. Barclay, 369 P.2d 808, 809 (Okla. 1962).
114. See Thompson v. Madison Mach. Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 565, 568 (Okla. Civ. App.
1984) (quoting Hull v. Wolfe, 393 P.2d 491, 493 (Okla. 1964)) (“[T]he Act was intended to
cover all accidental injuries, but did not include willful or intentional injuries whether
inflicted by the employer or the employee, since same was not accidental.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
115. See Roberts, 369 P.2d at 809.
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an employee should not be precluded from pursuing common law tort
claims arising out of an employer’s intentional tort.116
As soon as an exception is made to exclusivity for intentional torts of the
employer, the definition of intent becomes highly significant. Oklahoma
courts have “long recognized . . . that in some cases ‘an employee who has
been wilfully injured by his employer [may] ha[ve] a common law action
for damages.”117 As early as 1917, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
worker’s compensation did not cover an employer’s willful or intentional
conduct and accordingly an employee maintained his common law rights to
sue his employer for such conduct in tort.118
An employee’s negligence claim is insufficient to fall within the
intentional tort exception in Oklahoma.119 In Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., a
baker filed a negligence claim against his employer when natural gas used
to heat an oven in the bakery exploded.120 The explosion burned the baker,
severely scarring his entire body, including his face, head, back, arms, and
hands.121 Because the baker claimed the injuries were caused by the
negligence of the employer, rather than the willful or intentional conduct of
the employer, the court held that the baker’s claims were barred by the
exclusivity of workers’ compensation.122
At the other end of the spectrum, a physical assault is sufficient to bring
an employee’s claim within the intentional tort exception.123 An employee

116. See id. (“Since our Workmen’s Compensation Law by its terms applies only to
disability or death resulting from accidental injuries . . . it may be conceded that an
employee who has been wilfully injured by his employer has a common law action for
damages.” (citation omitted)).
117. Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 574 (Okla. 2005), superseded by statute
2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33 (alterations in original) (quoting Roberts, 369 P.2d at 809).
118. See Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 162 P. 938, 945-46 (Okla. 1917).
119. See, e.g., id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. The baker appealed, arguing the statute denied the baker equal protection
under the law because the statute covered only accidental injuries, thereby denying the baker
compensation for the employer’s intentional conduct. The court upheld the constitutionality
of the statute, holding that although the statute only applies to accidental injuries, the statute
does not deny injured employees equal protection because the act “leaves the injured
employe[e] to his remedy as it existed when the act was passed” regarding the employer’s
intentional torts. Id. at 945.
123. See Thompson v. Madison Mach. Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 565, 568 (Okla. Civ. App.
1984); see also Pursell v. Pizza Inn Inc., 786 P.2d 716 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990) (holding that
employees’ common law suit against supervisors for sexual battery and assault was not
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brought a tort claim against his employer in Thompson v. Madison
Machinery Co.124 when a co-employee struck the employee “in the face
with a twelve inch crescent wrench during an argument.”125 The Oklahoma
Civil Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the employer and held that workers’ compensation is
not the exclusive remedy for willful, intentional, or violent acts, as these
acts are not accidental.126 The court explained that workers’ compensation
was not “designed to shield employers or co-employees from willful,
intentional or even violent conduct.”127
Like courts in virtually every other jurisdiction, Oklahoma courts have
struggled to articulate a standard that adequately addresses employee claims
arising in the vast grey area between negligence and purpose that includes
gross negligence, recklessness, knowledge of a foreseeable risk, knowledge
of a substantially certain risk, and various gradations between these
standards.
For example, the court initially passed on the opportunity to establish
whether or not gross negligence was sufficient to bring an employee’s
claim within the intentional tort exception in U.S. Zinc. Co. v. Ross.128
While attempting to remove ore that had become stuck in a rock crushing
machine, the employee’s hand got stuck and was crushed.129 The court
determined it was unnecessary to decide whether, in the abstract,
negligently failing to safeguard such a machine could constitute “such gross
negligence to amount to a willful and intentional injury inflicted by the
employer.”130 Even if possible, the facts at bar were insufficient to
establish such a claim.131 Accordingly, the court held that the employee’s
claim was barred.132
The court explained, “[t]he willfulness contemplated amounts to more
than a mere act of the will, and carries with it the idea of premeditation,
obstinacy, and intentional wrongdoing.”133 Among other shortcomings, the
barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity provision because the injury was not
accidental).
124. 684 P.2d 565 (Okla. Civ. App. 1984).
125. Id. at 566.
126. See id. at 567, 568, 570.
127. Id. at 568; see also Pursell, 786 P.2d 716.
128. 208 P. 805 (Okla. 1922).
129. Id. at 806.
130. Id. at 807.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 806.
133. Id. at 807 (quoting Wick v. Gunn, 169 P. 1087, 1090 (Okla. 1917)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012

90

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:75

employee failed to adduce any evidence that covering the machine with an
apron, as the employee contended the employer should have done, was
legally required, customary in the industry, or even practicable.134 Were
these standard allegations of negligence sufficient to constitute a willful and
intentional injury, the act would prove null “because every injury could be
defined to be a willful and intentional injury.”135
In Harrington v. Certified Systems, Inc., an Oklahoma court directly
addressed for the first time the requisite standard of intent necessary to
bring an employee’s claim within the intentional tort exception.136 The
court concluded that in all Oklahoma cases applying the intentional tort
exception, the court had decided whether the conduct at issue constituted an
intentional tort without ever clearly defining what constituted an intentional
tort in the first place.137 The court explained that intent requires “knowing
and purposeful conduct on the part of the employer to injure the
employee.”138
The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted the jurisdictional split regarding the
standard of intent—purpose versus substantial certainty—necessary to
bring an employer’s conduct within the intentional tort exception to
workers’ compensation exclusivity in Davis v. CMS Continental Natural
Gas, Inc.139 Because the employee conceded the employer’s conduct was
neither willful nor wanton (states of mind less culpable than either
competing standard of intent), the Supreme Court determined it was
unnecessary to resolve the issue of which standard to adopt in Oklahoma, as
the employee’s claim was insufficient to satisfy either standard. 140
B. Parret v. UNICCO Service Co.
In Parret v. UNICCO Service Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court
determined an employee’s claim would fall outside of the exclusive remedy
provisions of workers’ compensation if the injuries were the result of

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 45 P.3d 430 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001).
137. Id. at 434.
138. Id. at 435 (emphasis added). The Court, however, did not rely on this higher
standard in barring the employee’s claim. The court noted that the facts in this case were not
sufficient to constitute an intentional tort under even the more liberal substantial certainty
standard. Id. at 436.
139. 23 P.3d 288, 294 (Okla. 2001).
140. See id. at 290, 291 n.6.
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actions the employer knew were substantially certain to cause injury.141 By
doing so, it chose to incorporate the broader of the two standards of intent
in applying the intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation
exclusivity.142
1. Facts and Procedural History
Parret was electrocuted at a tire plant replacing emergency lights while
on the job.143 He died from his injuries two days later.144 Parret’s employer
knew of the danger to its employees in working on the emergency lights
while they were still energized—that is, without first cutting off the
electricity to the light system as Parret was doing when he was fatally
injured.145 The employer even “had written policies prohibiting employees
from working on energized equipment” but apparently allowed the
employees to continue working on the emergency lights knowing it was
unsafe.146
After Parret’s death, his widow brought a case in tort against Parret’s
employer, UNICCO. The Federal District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma, where the action was pending, certified the following question
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: “What is the standard of intent necessary
for an employee’s tort claim against an employer to fall outside the
protection of the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act? Is the standard
the ‘true intentional tort’ test, requiring deliberate specific intent to cause
injury, or is the standard the ‘substantial certainty’ test?”147 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court determined the requisite standard of intent: “the employer
must have (1) desired to bring about the worker’s injury or (2) acted with

141. Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 574 (Okla. 2005), superseded by
statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33. Also at issue was “the test for determining
statutory employer status.” However, this issue is not addressed since it is not relevant to
this Note.
142. Id. at 579. The Parret court explained that the substantial certainty standard is not
meant to expand the narrow intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity.
Instead, the substantial certainty test reflects the court’s “refusal to apply a stricter standard
of intent to a worker’s tort claim against the employer than the Restatement standard of
intent which would be applied to any other intentional tort.” Id.
143. Id. at 574.
144. Id. This note will not address Justice Opala’s argument that plaintiff’s suit should
have been barred as a result of plaintiff’s earlier selection of the compensation remedy which
she prosecuted to a successful conclusion.
145. See id. at 574.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 573.
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the knowledge that such injury was substantially certain to result from the
employer’s conduct.”148
2. The Majority Opinion of Justice Colbert
In describing the substantial certainty standard, the court stated that to
act with knowledge of a substantial certainty of impending injury, the
employer must intend “the act that caused the injury with knowledge that
the injury was substantially certain to follow.”149 The court determined it
was not sufficient that the injury was objectively substantially certain to
Instead, the plaintiff must demonstrate, often through
occur.150
circumstantial evidence, that the employer subjectively appreciated the
substantial certainty of the impending injury.151
This subjective
appreciation may be “inferred from the employer’s conduct and all the
surrounding circumstances.”152
The court noted that the plaintiff bears a heavy burden in demonstrating
an employer’s knowledge of the substantial certainty of an injury. The
plaintiff does not carry his burden by demonstrating knowledge of
foreseeable risk, high probability, or even substantial likelihood.153 To be
sure, “[n]othing short of the employer’s knowledge of the ‘substantial
certainty’ of injury will remove the injured worker’s claim from the
exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act.”154
The court advanced several policy reasons for adopting the substantial
certainty standard including:
(1) the substantial certainty standard is consistent with the traditional
definition of intent in torts;155

148. Id. at 579.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965)). The Restatement,
for example, uses the term “intent” to refer to instances in which the actor “desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it.” Id. at 577. Intent is not exclusively used throughout the Restatement to refer
to desired consequences. Instead, “[i]f the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or
substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if
he had in fact desired to produce the result.” Id.
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(2) the substantial certainty standard of intent preserves the proper
balance of interests achieved in the industrial bargain between employees
and employers;156 and
(3) the substantial certainty standard promotes workplace safety.157
Finally, the court acknowledged two primary concerns with employing
the substantial certainty standard: (1) that there is potential for confusion in
applying the standard and (2) the standard could open the floodgates of
litigation.158 In the majority’s view, however, neither concern proved
significant enough to warrant the adoption of the contending “true intent”
standard.159 With respect to the first concern, the majority felt that
confusion in applying the standard could be avoided as the court had
meticulously outlined what a plaintiff must show in order to meet the
burden of demonstrating that the employer was substantially certain that an
injury would result.160 As to the concern over proliferation of lawsuits, the
majority thought that this result was not likely to obtain in Oklahoma since
“in most instances, the predicted flood of litigation has not occurred, mainly
because the courts, undoubtedly conscious of the dangers, have been quite

156. See id. at 578. The Oklahoma workers’ compensation statute provides many
exceptions to workers’ compensation coverage for the employee’s willful misconduct,
including “(1) willful injury to self or another, (2) failure to use a guard or protection
furnished against accident, (3) substance abuse, or (4) horseplay.” Id. To preserve this
delicate balance, in light of these exceptions “which favor the employer . . . a less stringent
standard than ‘specific intent’ [should] be applied in determining whether an employee may
recover damages, as opposed to benefits, as a result of the employer’s intentional
misconduct.” Id. The substantial certainty standard achieves this balance “by emphasizing
employees’ interest in protection from employer misconduct while maintaining employers’
fixed liability for all but intentional workplace injuries.” Id.
157. Id. Even when an employer does not desire, or specifically intend, to cause injury to
an employee, at times the employer “certainly takes a calculated risk with their lives and
safety—and perhaps takes all the greater risk because the employer knows that when injury
inevitably does occur, the cost will be less because of the exclusive remedy and limited
compensation provisions of the workers’ compensation.” Id. In these situations, applying
the true intentional tort standard “allows employers to injure and even kill employees and
suffer only workers’ compensation damages so long as the employer did not specifically
intend to hurt the worker.” Id. Along similar lines, the Parret court explained that the
substantial certainty test “furthers the general tort principle that injuries are to be
compensated and antisocial behavior is to be discouraged.” Id. at 579.
158. See id. at 578-79, 79 n.3.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 572.
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conservative about allowing these kind of exceptions to exclusivity. Most
have been careful to limit use to the most egregious cases.”161
3. Justice Winchester, with Whom Justices Lavender and Opala Join,
Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
Instead of adopting the substantial certainty standard, Justices
Winchester, Lavender, and Opala would have adopted the true intent
standard.162 The dissent authored by Justice Winchester reasoned, in part:
(1) the Oklahoma legislature established the workers’ compensation
system and its separate court system specifically to address work-related
injuries;163
(2) the Oklahoma’s Workers’ Compensation Act represents a mutual
compromise, reflecting on the industrial bargain reached between
employers and employees:164
(3) since “the express words of the Legislature provide balance to
competing interests . . . the Legislature intended all but the most egregious
circumstances to be covered by this statutory remedy;”165 and
(4) [t]he standard set for such cases must be clear, concise and easily
ascertainable and only the ‘true intentional tort’ test provides such an
objective standard.”166
4. Justice Opala, with Whom Justice Winchester Joins, Dissenting in
Part
Justice Opala stated that instead of adopting the “foreign doctrine of
‘substantial certainty,’ the court should respect the parameters that have
confined the intentional tort exception “for nearly a century—at the willful
tort line.”167 Justice Opala was concerned that the substantial certainty
161. Id. at 579 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 6 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX
K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 103.04[4] (Matthew Bender
2004)).
162. Id. at 581 (Winchester, V.C.J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 583 (Opala, J., dissenting). Note that in Justice Opala’s view, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court should not address the certified question of what intent standard should
apply to avoid workers’ compensation exclusivity without further assurances from the
certifying court that plaintiff’s tort claim was not barred by issue preclusion since Parret had
elected to receive workers’ compensation death benefits and the order in the workers’
compensation matter stated that the injury was accidental. Id.
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standard subjects employers to tort liability for torts of gross negligence and
recklessness.168
Justice Opala recounted the industrial bargain between employees and
employers in which the employee gave up the right to common law tort
suits based upon the employer’s negligence and the employer gave up its
corresponding defenses including contributory negligence.169 Justice Opala
observed that the employer maintains the defense of contributory
negligence against employee tort claims premised on employer
recklessness.170 Justice Opala concluded that the standard of intent should
be set “at the demarcation that separates torts in which contributory
negligence is a defense from torts in which contributory negligence is not a
defense”—that is at the willful tort line.171
5. Continuation in Trial Court After Oklahoma Supreme Court
Determined the Substantial Certainly Standard Applied
After the Oklahoma Supreme Court answered the question posed by the
trial court and adopted the substantial certainty standard, Parret’s employer
filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial court. The employer
asserted Parret could not meet his burden under the substantial certainty
test.172 The trial court first addressed whether Parret’s tort claim was barred
by issue preclusion.173 It found Parret’s claim was not barred even though
Parret’s widow received death benefits through workers’ compensation.174
The trial court then looked to the evidence. There was evidence
presented “that UNICCO knew that there were no current electrical prints
or lockout/tagout procedures for the emergency lighting system in the
warehouse area” where Parret was working and that “UNICCO employees
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 584.
171. Id.
172. Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., No. CIV-01-1432-HE, 2006 WL 752877, at *1, *2
(W.D. Okla. Mar. 21, 2006) (“The record before the court does not demonstrate that the
nature of the decedent’s injury, as relevant to the present inquiry, was ‘actually litigated.’
Whether the injury was ‘accidental’ from the standpoint of the employee, which was the
issue in the workers' compensation proceeding, is not the same question as whether the
employer's conduct was ‘intentional’ within the meaning of the exclusivity exception. There
is no suggestion here that the nature of the employer’s conduct was decided or even
addressed in the proceeding. Under these circumstances, the doctrine of issue preclusion
does not apply to bar the plaintiff’s claim.”).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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did not know how to disconnect the power to the lights without serious
adverse consequences.”175 The record also reflected that a few months
before Parret was killed, another employee was electrically shocked and his
hand badly burned “while working on a similar voltage lighting system.”176
More importantly, evidence had been “submitted that UNICCO supervisors
not only were aware that employees worked on the emergency lighting
system ‘hot,’ but directed them to do so.”177 There was also “evidence that
several employees refused to work on the emergency lights because they
could not be de-energized, but that UNICCO supervisors would then, on
occasion, direct the same work order to other employees.”178
Analyzing the evidence in the light most favorable to Parret, the trial
court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment stating:
The court concludes the evidence identified above, combined
with other evidence in the record, is sufficient to create a triable
issue and to warrant submission of the plaintiff's intentional tort
claim against UNICCO to a jury. The question is close because
of the very narrow nature of the intentional tort exception to the
exclusive remedy rule.
The “substantial certainty” test
announced by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Parret is a high
standard and will rarely be met.
Nonetheless, in the
circumstances existing here, the court concludes the plaintiff's
claim against UNICCO is supported by evidence which, when
taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to
create a triable issue of fact as to whether that admittedly
stringent standard has been satisfied.179
It is interesting to note that after the employer’s motion for summary
judgment was denied, the Parret case did not go to trial.
C. The Effect of Parret: A Survey of Post-Parret Decisions
Oklahoma’s adoption of the substantial certainty standard produced three
related effects. First, the substantial certainty standard liberalized the
requirements an employee must satisfy to proceed in tort—that is withstand
a motion for summary judgment—against an employer. Second, adopting
the substantial certainty standard affected when an employee may recover
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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in tort against an employer. Third, adopting the substantial certainty
standard affected the scope of employers’ liability insurance.
The first effect of the substantial certainty standard was seen in the
denial of summary judgment in Baggett v. Yaffe Companies, Inc.180 In
Baggett, part of the employer’s business included the decommissioning of
artillery shells.181 At least one employee refused to work on one of these
shells after a supervisor “observed flammable gases, melting substances and
tan liquid explosive pour out of the shells.”182 The employer was alerted of
these dangers.183
The employer then assigned a twenty-four-year-old temporary employee
to work on the shells.184 The employee, unaware of any dangers, cut into
the shell as instructed using a hand-held acetylene torch.185 The shell
exploded and, after spending two weeks in the intensive care unit, the
employee died.186
The employee’s estate filed suit, alleging the employer was aware of the
substantial certainty of injury to the employee.187 The plaintiffs alleged the
employer instructed the employee to engage in unreasonably dangerous
conduct all for opportunity to recover a dollar’s worth of brass and steel
from the shell.188
Had Oklahoma adopted the purpose to injure standard, the court likely
would have granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment, as the
plaintiffs conceded that the employer was motivated by the desire to
recover the value of the brass and steel, not to injure the employee.189
Instead, applying the substantial certainty standard, the court denied the
employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of

180. Order at 3, Baggett v. Yaffe Cos., No. CJ-2009-87 (Leflore Cnty., Okla. May 10,
2010).
181. See id.
182. See id. at 2.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 1-3.
186. See id. at 3.
187. See Plaintiff’s Response In Chief to Yaffe Cos. & Yaffe Iron & Metal Corp.’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Baggett v. Yaffe Cos., No. CJ-2009-87 (Leflore Cnty.,
Okla. Nov. 16, 2009).
188. See id. at 1.
189. See Davis v. U.S. Emp’rs Council, Inc, 934 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)
(applying the purpose to injure standard, the court barred an employee’s claim despite the
employer’s actual knowledge of certain injury because the employee conceded the employer
was motivated by a desire to save money).
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material fact existed as to whether the employer was substantially certain
the employee would be injured.190
Second, the substantial certainty standard affected when an employee
may recover in tort against an employer. In Price v. Howard,191 an
employee was killed in a plane crash.192 His wife sued, alleging the
employer was substantially certain the employee would be injured during
the flight.193
The airplane, carrying passengers in violation of flight restrictions and
cargo in excess of weight restrictions, took off in a turbulent rain storm the
night of the crash.194 The plane had been modified to include an
experimental five-bladed propeller and fuel tanks.195
The court barred the wife’s claim, holding that the alleged facts did not
satisfy the substantial certainty standard.196 The court emphasized the
substantial certainty standard “presents a formidable barrier to recovery in
tort.”197
Canvassing the record, the court noted that other aircraft utilizing the
experimental five-bladed propeller had made successful flights before and
that this specific aircraft had flown with the experimental propeller between
twenty and thirty hours without incident; however, “the plane had not flown
with the additional tanks fueled.”198 The court was also persuaded by the
lack of evidence indicating that any of the passengers of the plane
“appreciated the risk or were intent on committing suicide by boarding the
plane for takeoff.”199
The court was aware that taking off in a rainstorm with cargo in excess
of 1,000 pounds over the plane’s weight limit “substantially increased the
likelihood that complications could occur.”200 Although it concluded that
allowing the plane to take flight under the stated conditions was reckless,
recklessness alone is insufficient to bring a claim within the intentional tort
exception.201 Similarly, the violation of safety regulations, “even if wilful
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Order, supra note 180, at 3.
236 P.3d 82 (Okla. 2010).
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 89-90 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 90.
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and knowing, does not rise to the level of an intentional tort or an actual
intent to injure.”202
Third, the substantial certainty standard affected the scope of employers’
liability insurance. Where an employer’s liability insurance excludes
liability predicated on the employer’s intentional misconduct, the more
liberal substantial certainty standard has the effect of broadening the
coverage exclusion. The result is that an employer, shielded from liability
under the more restrictive purpose standard, may be surprised to find that
the insurance does not cover certain conduct under the substantial certainty
standard.203
In CompSource Oklahoma v. L & L Construction, Inc., an employee,
while working in a confined space, was overcome by hydrogen sulfide—a
gas that the employer allegedly knew or should have known was fatally
toxic and a common byproduct of the employer’s line of business.204 The
employee then lost consciousness, fell, violently struck his head, and
ultimately died a few hours later.205
The employee’s estate filed a tort claim against the employer, alleging
that injury to the employee was substantially certain to result from the
employer’s failure “to properly educate, train and protect decedent in
conjunction with its knowledge of the lethal properties of hydrogen sulfide
gases and decedent’s exposure to them.”206
The issue before the court involved the contract between the employer
and CompSource. In its contract with L & L Construction, CompSource
agreed to indemnify, defend, and compensate the employer against and for
workers’ compensation claims.207 The policy provided an exclusion for
“bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by [the employer].”208
Relying on this provision and Oklahoma’s recent standard of intent set forth
in Parret, CompSource sought declaratory judgment to establish
CompSource did not have a duty to defend or compensate the employer.209
The court ruled in favor of CompSource, holding that CompSource owed
no duty to the insured employer as the policy specifically excludes
202.
203.
2009).
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., CompSource Okla. v. L & L Constr., Inc., 207 P.3d 415 (Okla. Civ. App.
Id. at 417.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
See id. at 416.
Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
See id. at 416-17.
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intentional torts.210 The court explained that in Parret, the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma had “clarified what kind of conduct constituted an intentional
tort.”211 An employee’s claim satisfies the requisite intent standard if the
employee shows that the employer “(1) desired to bring about the worker’s
injury, or (2) acted with the knowledge that such injury was substantially
certain to result.”212 Although declining to assess the sufficiency of
CompSource’s underlying petition, the court held, “it is enough that [the
employee] has attempted to allege an intentional tort under the Workers
Compensation Act so as to avoid the exclusive remedy provision.”213
D. The 2010 Amendments to Oklahoma Worker’s Compensation Act: Title
85, Section 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes
The Oklahoma legislature, in adopting the 2010 amendments to workers’
compensation, effectively overturned Parret and adopted the purpose to
injure standard.214 The amended exclusivity provision now provides that
workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for an injured employee
“except in the case of an intentional tort, or where the employer has failed
to secure the payment of compensation for the injured employee.”215 The
statute explicitly states that an intentional tort “exist[s] only when the
employee is injured as a result of willful, deliberate, specific intent of the
employer to cause such injury.”216 A plaintiff’s successful demonstration
that the employer had” knowledge that such injury was substantially certain
to result from [its] conduct”217 is insufficient to establish an intentional tort
for purposes of the exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity.218

210. See id. at 420-21.
211. Id. at 420.
212. Id. at 420-21 (quoting Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 579 (Okla. 2005),
superseded by statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33).
213. Id. at 421.
214. See 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302 (2011); Parret, 127 P.3d at 579.
215. 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302. The statute also provides an exception to exclusivity “where
the employer has failed to secure the payment of compensation for the injured employee”.
Id.
216. Id.
217. Parret, 127 P.3d at 579.
218. See 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302.
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V. Purpose to Injure Is the Appropriate Standard to Define the Scope of the
Intentional Tort Exception to Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity
The Oklahoma Legislature adopted the proper standard of intent—
purpose to injure—for defining the parameters of the intentional tort
exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity.
A. Purpose to Cause Injury Is Consistent with the Majority of Jurisdictions
Oklahoma has joined the majority of states in adopting the true intent
standard.219 Today, all but nine states recognize an exception to workers’
compensation exclusivity for an employer’s intentional torts.220 Of the
states that do provide such an exception, slightly more than twenty states
expressly have adopted the purpose to injure standard.221 Approximately
eight other states have adopted a similar or slightly more restrictive
formulation of the purpose to injure standard.222 The remaining minority of
roughly ten states have adopted the substantial certainty standard.223
While the mere fact that the majority of legislatures have adopted a
similar standard does not in itself warrant the adoption of the same in
Oklahoma. Nonetheless, it indicates that other legislatures in weighing the
competing interests of employees and employers involved in setting the
standard of intent have determined that the purpose to injure standard is
more consistent with workers’ compensation policy.
Adopting the majority standard in Oklahoma is also important for
Oklahoma business. If Oklahoma adopted the less exacting minority
substantial certainty standard, employers may be discouraged from
operating their businesses in Oklahoma when instead they could operate in
nearby states such as Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, and Missouri that apply
a more exacting standard.224

219. See Appendix; see also King v. Penrod Drilling Co., 652 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 (D.
Nev. 1987).
220. See Appendix (stating that Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wisconsin and Wyoming do not currently allow an exception to
exclusivity for an employer’s intentional conduct).
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.; Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 575 (Okla. 2005), superseded
by statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33.
224. See Appendix.
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B. The Purpose to Cause Injury Standard Is a Bright Line Rule
An employer acts with “purpose” to cause injury if, and only if, it is his
conscious object to cause such injury.225 As a result, an employer harboring
any motive other than a desire to injure the employee does not act with
purpose.226 This holds true irrespective of the employer’s awareness of the
certainty of the employee’s injury.227
In stark contrast to the bright line rule, the substantial certainty standard
depends upon subtle gradations of knowledge that include knowledge of
foreseeable risk, substantial likelihood of risk, substantial certainty of risk,
and virtual certainty of risk. The Supreme Court of Michigan criticized the
standard, noting:
The problem with the substantial certainty test is that it is
difficult to draw the line between substantial certainty and
substantial risk. In applying the substantial certainty test, some
courts have confused intentional, reckless, and even negligent
misconduct, and therefore blurred the line between intentional
and accidental injuries. The true intentional tort standard
[should] keep the distinction clear.228
Part of the reason that the substantial certainty standard is confusing is
that it is inconsistent with the common use of the word “intent.” The Court
of Appeals of Maryland noted that intent “is the word commonly used to
describe the purpose to bring about stated physical consequences.”229
Because the substantial certainty standard is inconsistent with the common
understanding of intent, “any serious application of the [standard] . . .
requires us to engage in strange verbal contortions.”230 The substantial
certainty standard,

225. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (2011).
226. See Davis v. U.S. Emp’rs Council, Inc., 934 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 1 cmt. c (2010).
228. Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 398 N.W.2d 882, 893 (Mich. 1986) (footnote
omitted), superseded by statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.131 (West Supp. 2011)
(providing that the exception to exclusivity is satisfied only when an “employer specifically
intended an injury”).
229. Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 503 A.2d 708, 712 (Md. 1986)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)).
230. Anthony Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement
(Third)’s Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (2001).
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like Voltaire's God, seems to have been invented out of
necessity, since it resembles no intuitively familiar mental state
and is famously difficult to explain to skeptical first year
students who have not yet checked their common sense at the
law school's front door. It is something less than certainty (which
would be too strong) and more than highly probable (which
would be too weak, and would collapse the whole category into
recklessness). It is a concept, which, having no fixed meaning,
can, as the workman's compensation cases discussed above
show, mean whatever a judge wants.231
The Parret court thought its careful articulation of the substantial
certainty standard would prevent the newly adopted standard from opening
the floodgates of litigation. But, the standard has proven to be both difficult
to apply and fact intensive. Even after the Oklahoma Supreme Court
required the use of the substantial certainty test, the trial court in Parret
refused to grant the employer’s motion for summary judgment.232 Many
other tort cases involving employee injury were filed outside of the workers
compensation arena and similarly survived motions for summary judgment.
The difficulty in applying the standard is illustrated in a recent
unreported decision in Oklahoma wherein the court, discussing the
substantial certainty test, found “it interesting that the ‘substantial certainty’
standard as adopted in this case is closely akin to the standards established
for ‘willful and wanton’ misconduct as described by Professor Prosser in
his treatise on torts.”233 The court explained that for an employer’s conduct
to be willful or wanton, the employer need not intend to cause injury.234
Instead, it is sufficient that the employer act “in total disregard of the
consequences and under such circumstances that a reasonable man would
know or have reason to know that such conduct would be likely to result in
substantial harm to another.”235
The requisite intent for willful and wanton conduct differs from
substantial certainty described in Parret because it requires only that the
injury be “likely” to occur as opposed to being substantially certain to

231. Id.
232. See Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., No. CIV-01-1432-HE, 2006 WL 752877, at *4
(W.D. Okla. Mar. 21, 2006).
233. Order, supra note 180, at 2.
234. Id. at 2-3 (citing Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342 (Okla. 1993)).
235. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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occur.236 The court’s recognition of standard similarity, even after the
Parret court’s painstaking efforts to distinguish the substantial certainty
standard from less culpable states of mind, highlights the difficultly courts
across the country have had in applying the standard.
C. The Purpose to Cause Injury Standard Avoids Litigation in All but the
Most Egregious of Situations
An employee’s tort claim, in a jurisdiction applying the purpose to injure
standard, will be barred in all but the most egregious of cases.237 An
employee’s tort claim in a jurisdiction applying the substantial certainty
standard, however, will likely survive an employer’s motion for summary
judgment even if based upon factual allegations sufficient to satisfy only
the recklessness standard. Requiring juries to resolve these grey area cases,
ranging from recklessness to certainty of injury, creates uncertainty both in
terms of the existence and extent of employer liability. This uncertainty
threatens to unsettle the balance of the interests reflected in the industrial
bargain which provides employers with definite yet limited liability and
employees with automatic yet limited recovery.
As with any claim, once the standard is established, the underlying facts
of the claim must be applied to the requisite standard. In the workers’
compensation context, not only is the substantial certainty standard itself
imprecise and confusing, but the facts introduce their own complexities,
given that the dispositive issue is the degree of the employer’s subjective
appreciation of a known risk.
Due to the importance of subtle fact variations in each case, appellate
courts across various jurisdictions have overturned trial courts’ grants of
summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that whether the
employer’s alleged conduct was sufficient to constitute knowledge of a
substantial certainty of injury presented an issue of material fact that must
be resolved by the jury.238
For example, in O’Brien v. Ottawa Silica Co., an employee contracted
respiratory disease from exposure to asbestos.239 Company doctors
236. See id; Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 579 (Okla. 2005), superseded by
statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33.
237. Parret, 127 P.3d at 575 (quoting 48 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 2 (1987)) (“[I]n
any jurisdiction applying the ‘specific intent’ standard, ‘unless the case involves an assault
or a battery, recovery will probably be denied.’”).
238. See, e.g., Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 639 A.2d 507, 508, 513 (Conn. 1994)
(noting cases in which other appellate courts have made similar holdings).
239. 656 F. Supp. 610, 611 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
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recommended that the employer take precautionary measures to protect the
employee.240 The employer, however, not only failed to implement these
precautionary measures, but also withheld the doctors’ finding of calcified
plaques in the employee’s lungs, effectively precluding the employee from
seeking early medical treatment.241 The court reasoned, “[i]f proven, these
facts might permit an inference that [the employer] knew injury to [the
employee] was substantially certain to occur.”242
Likewise, in Kielwein v. Gulf Nuclear, Inc., when the employer directed
the employee to clean up a radiation spill while denying the employee
access to safety materials, the court held that an issue of material fact
existed as to whether the employer was substantially certain injury would
result.243
Similarly in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., an employee’s fingers
were partially amputated when his fingers got stuck in a plastic molding
machine while the employee was “attempting to clear hot molten plastic out
of . . . [the] machine.”244 The employee alleged that injury resulted from
the employer’s “wilful and serious misconduct.”245 More specifically, the
defendant alleged the employer: (1) required employees to clear the
machine while the machine was in use; (2) denied employees access to
safer methods; and (3) failed to install a protective covering over the
machine to mitigate the likelihood of injury.246 The appellate court reversed
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer,
finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the
employer was substantially certain that injury would result.247
The employer, in each of the cases, was aware that the employer’s
conduct created some degree of risk of injury to the employee.248 In these
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 783 S.W.2d 746, 747-48 (Tex. App. 1990).
244. 639 A.2d 507, 508 (Conn. 1994).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 508, 513 (“Here, a jury could reasonably infer, from all the circumstances
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that the defendant's conduct constituted
more than a mere failure to provide appropriate safety or protective measures, and that the
plaintiff's injury was the inevitable and known result of the actions required of him by the
defendant.”).
248. See O'Brien v. Ottawa Silica Co., 656 F. Supp. 610, 611 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
(employer withheld from employee a physician’s report indicating the employee had
calcified plaques in his lung); Suarez, 639 A.2d 507, 509 (Conn. 1994) (employer’s conduct
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cases, the only issue remaining for the juries to resolve was how aware the
employers were of the likelihood of injury to the employee. If the employer
was substantially certain of the risk of injury, the employee’s claim would
fall within the intentional tort exception and the claim would not be barred
by the exclusivity provision. If, on the other hand, the employer was only
aware of the substantial likelihood of injury or was reckless with respect to
the likelihood of injury, the employee’s claim does not satisfy the
intentional tort exception and the claim will be barred.
Although courts have attempted to clearly define the substantial certainty
standard, as O’Brien, Kielwein, and Suarez demonstrate, employers’
motions for summary judgment in all but the most basic negligence claims
will be denied. Thus, while only conduct rising to the level of substantial
certainty is sufficient to establish liability, many claims ultimately
amounting to mere recklessness must survive summary judgment so that the
jury can make that determination. Since employee claims premised on
employer recklessness must survive summary judgment, employers must
either defend against or settle claims that under the more exacting purpose
to injure standard would be barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity.
This substantial increase in litigation countermands the employer’s
principal benefit of the industrial bargain—certain yet limited liability.
D. The Purpose to Cause Injury Standard Is More Consistent with the Nofault Principle of Workers’ Compensation
Not only does the substantial certainty test require the trier of fact to
assess the employer’s degree of awareness of risk, it also requires a
determination of whether the employer was culpable as opposed to just
whether the injury was work related.
Even with the most precise definition by a state’s legislature or highest
court, a jury may be unlikely to understand, let alone apply, a complex
substantial certainty standard. The jury may instead inappropriately
associate egregious conduct or heinous injury with an employer’s
knowledge of the substantial certainty of injury. But, unlike tort, recovery
in workers’ compensation depends not upon the egregiousness of the
employer’s conduct but instead “depends on one simple test: Was there a
work-connected injury?”249 If so, the employee’s claim is generally
violated O.S.H.A. standards and other accepted safety standards); Kielwein, 783 S.W.2d at
748 (“It is impossible for [the employer] to have been unaware that exposing [the employee]
to such risks without any protection whatsoever would be substantially certain to cause
[injury].”).
249. 1 LARSON, supra note 16, § 1.03(1).
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covered by workers’ compensation and therefore barred by exclusivity.
Professor Larson explains:
Negligence, and, for the most part, fault, are not in issue and
cannot affect the result. Let the employer’s conduct be flawless
in its perfection, and let the employee’s be abysmal in its
clumsiness, rashness and ineptitude; if the accident arises out of
and in the course of the employment, the employee receives an
award. Reverse the positions, with a careless and stupid
employer and a wholly innocent employee and the same award
issues.
Thus, the test is not the relation of an individual’s personal
quality (fault) to an event, but the relationship of an event to an
employment. The essence of applying the test is not a matter of
assessing blame, but of marking out boundaries.”250
Allowing juries to determine whether an employer’s subjective
knowledge satisfies an imprecise substantial certainty standard risks
violating this fundamental principle that fault is largely immaterial in
workers’ compensation.
Having juries assess the degree of knowledge with which the employer
acted in itself disregards this fundamental test for coverage of whether the
injury was work related. For example, in denying the employers’ motions
for summary judgment in O’Brien, Kielwein, and Suarez, the courts held
that the juries must determine the likelihood of injury of which the
employers were aware.
In all three cases, the employer engaged in egregious conduct. In
O’Brien, the employer concealed the existence of a medical condition from
an employee effectively denying that employee the opportunity to seek
medical treatment.251 In Kielwein, the employer exposed the employee to
radiation yet denied the employee access to appropriate safety materials.252
In Suarez, the employer violated OSHA requirements and other safety
standards in failing to furnish an adequate guard to a plastic molding
machine and in refusing to allow the employee to fulfill his work
responsibilities in a safer fashion.253 Yet, in focusing upon the culpability
of the employer, the courts in each of these cases failed to address the more
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
O’Brien, 656 F. Supp. at 611.
Kielwein, 783 S.W.2d at 747.
Suarez, 639 A.2d at 508-09.
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relevant question of whether these injuries were work related and invited
juries to make their factual determinations in reference to the culpability of
the employer.
In each case, the injuries were work related and therefore within the
purview of workers’ compensation and its exclusivity. In O’Brien, for
example, the employee was exposed to asbestos in the workplace.254 The
employee in Kielwein was exposed to radioactive isotopes while
decontaminating an area following a radiation spill that occurred “when
another employee accidentally sliced through a sealed capsule.”255 Finally,
in Suarez, an employee sued his employer, Dickmont Plastics Corporation,
when two of the employee’s fingers were permanently injured after his
hand was caught in the plastic molding machine while the employee was
attempting to remove “hot molten plastic” from the machine.256 Had the
court applied the proper standard—whether there was a work related
injury—the employees’ remedy in O’Brien, Kielwein, and Suarez would
have been limited to that which is provided by workers’ compensation.257
E. Tort Law and Its Underlying Policies Should Not Govern Recovery in
Work Related Injuries
Considering the different objectives of workers’ compensation and tort
law, the legislature should assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the two competing standards in relation to the unique objectives of workers’
compensation law rather than the objectives of tort law. Professor Larson
observed one of two mistakes responsible for virtually “every major error
that can be observed in the development of compensation law, whether
judicial or legislative, can be traced . . . to the importation of tort ideas.” 258
A general understanding of the relationship between workers’
compensation, tort law, and social insurance proves fundamental to
avoiding this mistake.259
254. See O’Brien, 656 F. Supp. at 611.
255. Kielwein, 783 S.W.2d at 747.
256. Suarez, 639 A.2d at 508.
257. To be sure, the rationale behind the exception to exclusivity in jurisdictions that
apply the purpose to injure standard is that an employer’s purposeful injury of an employee
is neither accidental nor work-related. Thus the purpose to injure standard is consistent with
Professor Larson’s test of whether there was a work related injury. See 1 LARSON, supra
note 16, § 1.03(1).
258. Id. § 1.02. The other mistake attributable to these errors is “the assumption that the
right to compensation resembles the right to the proceeds of a personal insurance policy.”
Id. § 1.20.
259. See id.
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Workers’ compensation “is neither a branch of tort law nor [a form of]
social insurance;” however, workers’ compensation does exhibit some
characteristics of each.260 Similar to tort, but unlike social insurance,
liability for compensation rests solely with the employer. 261 Neither the
employee nor the state contributes to the system from which benefits are
disbursed. 262 On the other hand, similar to social insurance, but unlike tort,
benefits are determined “based largely on a social theory of providing
support and preventing destitution, rather than settling accounts between
two individuals according to their personal deserts or blame.” 263
To be clear, the substantial certainty standard is consistent with the
standard of intent used throughout the Restatement (Second) of Torts for
most intentional torts.264 Nevertheless, even tort law is now recognizing the
importance of distinguishing between purpose and substantial certainty in a
variety of contexts. The Restatement (Third) of Torts, for example,
distinguishes between the two standards in certain respects and
acknowledges that “purpose [provides] a clearly stronger basis for
liability.”265
The Restatement (Third) of Torts goes even further, explicitly separating
the two standards of intent and moving “what was once a mere
comment”—the definition of intent—“to the most prominent position,” the
first section.266 The Restatement (Third) of Torts summarizes the
complexity and centrality of the definition of intent in a variety of legal
contexts as follows:
[w]hether an act is characterized as intentional, reckless, or
negligent may determine whether punitive damages are
available, whether contribution is permitted in comparative fault,
whether a tort judgment will be dischargeable in bankruptcy,
whether liability insurance will cover an insured's tortious
conduct, whether a worker will be able to exit the workman's
compensation system and sue her employer in tort, whether
emotional distress will be available to a bystander, whether a
municipality can be sued in tort, whether affirmative defenses
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 1 cmt. a (2010).
266. Sebok, supra note 230, at 1167.
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are available, and whether the statute of limitations applicable to
a given action.267
The Restatement (Third) separates the two competing standards of intent
“to accommodate courts that in particular contexts might want to
distinguish between intent in the sense of purpose and intent in the sense of
knowledge.”268 Interestingly, the Restatement (Third) specifically identifies
the struggle among state courts to define intent for purposes of the
intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation as one of the primary
factors motivating its separation of the two definitions of intent.269
Despite important differences in policy objectives of tort law and
compensation law and the Restatement (Third)’s recognition of the need to
distinguish the two standards of intent, Parret relied heavily in its reasoning
on adopting a standard of intent consistent with tort policies and
terminology.270 The Parret court stated that the substantial certainty
standard “furthers the general tort principle that injuries are to be
compensated and anti-social behavior is to be discouraged.”271
Although fully compensating injuries and deterring misconduct remain
important policy objectives, these policies prove subordinate to other policy
considerations in workers’ compensation law.
As the Parret court observed, limiting an individual employee’s recovery
to that provided by workers’ compensation will often deny the employee
full and adequate compensation. The Parret court failed to realize,
however, that workers’ compensation law, unlike tort recovery, “does not
pretend to restore to the claimant what he or she has lost; it gives claimant a
sum which, added to his or her remaining earning ability, if any, will
presumably enable claimant to exist without being a burden to others.”272
It is important to remember that—unlike barring a claim for another
reason, such as the running of the statute of limitations which has the effect
of denying recovery entirely—barring an injured employee’s tort claim
267. Id. at 1168.
268. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §
1 cmt. a (2010).
269. Id.
270. See Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 577 (Okla. 2005), superseded by
statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A
(1965) (“THE WORD ‘INTENT’ IS USED THROUGHOUT THE RESTATEMENT . . . TO DENOTE THAT
THE ACTOR DESIRES TO CAUSE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACT, OR THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE
CONSEQUENCES ARE SUBSTANTIALLY CERTAIN TO RESULT FROM IT.”).
271. Parret, 127 P.3d at 579.
272. 1 LARSON, supra note 16, § 1.03(5).
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because of the exclusivity of workers’ compensation means only that the
employee’s recovery will be limited to workers’ compensation benefits.
Although these benefits are modest compared to potential tort damages, the
legislature set the benefit levels to meet the basic needs of the employer and
his dependents.273 The purposes of workers’ compensation “are best served
by allowing th[is] remedial system which the Legislature has created a
broad sphere of operation.”274 Courts should be wary not to disturb the
balance the legislature has struck in determining that “the benefits derived
from quick and certain basic compensation outweigh those from delayed
and contingent full compensation.”275
Additionally, the Parret court correctly observed that subjecting
employers to tort liability would have substantial deterrent value.276
Although the underlying employer conduct in many employee claims is
reprehensible, workers’ compensation law is motivated by policy
considerations other than deterring or punishing this conduct. Unlike tort
recovery, “[i]n compensation theory, liability is not supposed to hurt the
employer as it helps the employee, since the loss is normally passed on to
the consumer.”277 The ability of the employer to spread the cost of liability
for claims covered by the act likely decreases the employer’s incentive to
avoid the liability causing conduct.
The legislature, however, in
promulgating the workers’ compensation system has determined that the
benefits of certain and limited liability and automatic and certain recovery
outweigh the costs of the diminution in deterrent effect.
VI. Conclusion
The choice between which of the competing standards of intent to apply
to the intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation remains difficult

273. See id.
274. Kittell v. Vt. Weatherboard, Inc., 417 A.2d 926, 927 (Vt. 1980).
275. Id.
276. Parret, 127 P.3d at 578. In CompSource Oklahoma v. L & L Construction, Inc., the
employer’s liability insurance carrier successfully denied coverage of an employee’s claim
based upon a work related injury where the employee alleged the employer’s actions were
substantially certain to cause injury so as to not be bound by worker’s compensation
exclusivity, as the policy excluded coverage for intentional misconduct. 207 P.3d 415, 42021 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009). To the extent that substantial certainty has this effect, the
deterrent effect achieved in holding employers liable in tort for conduct substantially certain
to result in injury to an employee could be considerable.
277. 1 LARSON, supra note 16, § 1.03(7).
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due to competing policy considerations that militate in favor of each
standard.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Parret, weighing the competing
interests of employers and employees, adopted the substantial certainty
standard. In its view, the substantial certainty standard satisfies the general
purposes of workers’ compensation while simultaneously deterring
intentional employer wrongdoing and promoting safety in the workplace.
Subsequent to the Parret decision, the Oklahoma legislature, also weighing
these policy considerations, adopted the stricter "purpose" standard.
Considering overarching policies underlying workers’ compensation as a
whole, including ensuring certain and limited liability, the Oklahoma
Legislature adopted the proper standard. In individual instances, however,
the purpose standard will provide inadequate compensation to employees
injured by at times egregious employer conduct. The Parret court correctly
identified that the challenging cases lie between the extremes of employer
negligence and purposeful misconduct—“where the employer [is] . . . not
motivated by a desire to harm employees, but certainly tak[es] a calculated
risk with their lives and safety.”278 While those situations are likely rare,
the newly adopted purpose standard will bar employee recovery against the
employer in all but those situations where the employer purposefully
injured its employee.
Matthew K. Brown

278. Parret, 127 P.3d at 578 (quoting 7 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 197, § 2, at 204).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss1/3

2012]

NOTES

113

APPENDIX
State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Alabama

No exception for
employer's
intentional torts,
except those
torts so
tenuously
related to the
employment
relationship as
to fall outside
the coverage of
workers'
compensation,
such as fraud
and outrage.

Ala. Code § 25-5-53
(1975) (exclusive
remedy).

Alaska

Purpose/Specific
Intent (Judicial)

Alaska Stat. §
23.30.055
(exclusive remedy).

Arizona

Purpose/Specific
Intent
(Statutory)

Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 23-1022(A)(B) (exception to
exclusivity for
employer's "wilful
misconduct,"
defined as "an act
done knowingly and
purposely with the
direct object of
injuring another."

Raines v. Browning-Ferris Industries of
Alabama, Inc., 638 So.2d 1334 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1993) (providing an exception for
"tortious conduct committed outside the
course of the claimant's employment, such as
fraud or outrage."); Ex parte Progress Rail
Services Corp., 869 So.2d 459, 473 (Ala.
2003) ("It certainly can be argued that the
Legislature manifested an entirely different
intent in 1992 when it completely rewrote §
25-5-11 so as to specifically provide that
various parties, exclusive of the employer,
could be sued for willful conduct. The
Legislature's so specifying as to various
nonemployer parties, but providing no
corresponding “limited” immunity for
employers that would modify the “complete”
immunity employers had previously been
declared to enjoy, suggests that the Legislature
intended to leave unaltered the nature of
employer immunity."); Lowman v. Piedmont
Executive Shirt Mfg. Co., 547 So.2d 90, 94
(Ala. 1988) ("[T]he Act should not be an
impervious barrier, insulating a wrongdoer
from the payment of just and fair damages for
intentional tortious acts only very tenuously
related to workplace accidents.”).
Van Biene v. Era Helicopters, Inc., 779 P.2d
315, 319 (Alaska 1989)(requiring showing of
"intent to harm by the employer" ; Fenner v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 53 P.3d 573, 57778 (Alaska 2002)(finding no genuine issue of
material fact when plaintiff failed to adduce
evidence indicating defendant "specifically
intended to cause his injuries."
Johnson v. Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc.,
631 P.2d 548, 552 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981)(requiring showing of "deliberate
intention [to inflict injury] as distinguished
from some kind of intention presumed from
gross negligence."
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Arkansas

Purpose/
Specific Intent
(Judicial)

Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9105(a) (LexisNexis
Year)(exclusive
remedy).

California

3 Statutory
Exceptions

Colorado

Purpose/Specific
Intent (Judicial)

Cal. Labor Code § 3602
(exceptions to
exclusivity for: (1)
employer's "willful
physical assault" (2)
employer's "fraudulent
concealment of the
existence of the injury
and its connection with
the employment" (3)
"employee's injury or
death is proximately
caused by a defective
product manufactured
by the employer and
sold, leased, or
otherwise transferred for
valuable consideration
to an independent third
person, and that product
is thereafter provided
for the employee's use
by a third person."
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41102 (exclusive remedy).

Guerrero v. OK Foods, Inc., 230
S.W.3d 296, 298 (Ark. Ct. App.
2006)(internal quotation
omitted)("[T]he exception only
applies to acts committed with an
actual, specific, and deliberate intent
on the part of the employer to injure
the employee.").
Gunnell v. Metrocolor Laboratories,
Inc., Cal. Rptr. 2d 195 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001)(check cite and
page)(framing inquiry as whether
injury arose out of and in the course
of employment rather than an
inquiry as to "the state of knowledge
of the employer and the employee
regarding the dangerous condition
which caused the injury."

Connecticut

Substantial
Certainty
(Judicial)

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31284(a) (year) (exclusive
remedy).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss1/3

Schwindt v. Hershey Foods Corp.,
81 P.3d 1144, 1146-47 (Colo. App.
2003) (rejecting outright the
substantial certainty standard and
holding that the exception applies
only if "employer deliberately
intended to cause the injury").
McClain v. Pfizer, Inc., 692
F.Supp.2d 229, 243 (D.Conn., 2010)
(quoting Suarez v. Dickmont
Plastics Corp., 698 A.2d 838, 840841 (Conn. 1997) (“'[A] plaintiff
employee [can] establish an
intentional tort claim ... by proving
either [(1)] that the employer
actually intended to injure the
plaintiff (actual intent standard) or
[(2)] that the employer intentionally
created a dangerous condition that
made the plaintiff's injuries
substantially certain to occur
(substantial certainty standard).'”
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Delaware

Purpose/
Specifc Intent (but
statute/ cases
applies to coemployee not
employer;
possible employer
enjoys absolute
immunity (no
exception)
Virtually Certain
(Statutory)

Del. Code Ann. tit. 19 §§
2301, 2304

Ward v. General Motors Corp.,
431 A.2d 1277, 1279 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1981)(citing Del. Code Ann.
Tit. 19 § 2301 and explaining that
Delaware requires specific intent).

Fla. Stat. § 440.11(1)(b)
(the employee must
prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that
"1. The employer
deliberately intended to
injure the employee; or 2.
The employer engaged in
conduct that the employer
knew, based on prior
similar accidents or on
explicit warnings
specifically identifying a
known danger, was
virtually certain to result
in injury or death to the
employee, and the
employee was not aware
of the risk because the
danger was not apparent
and the employer
deliberately concealed or
misrepresented the
danger so as to prevent
the employee from
exercising informed
judgment about whether
to perform the work.

Jones v. Martin Electronics, Inc.,
932 So. 2d 1100, 1105 (Fla. 2006)
(holding that the employee's claim
is not barred by the exclusivity
provision "if the employer's
conduct is to the level of
intentional conduct substantially
certain to result in injury").

Exception for
employer's
intentional torts
entirely unrelated
to the employment
relationship;
however, if the
animosity
motivating the
intentional tort
arises from the
employment
relationship, the
claim is barred.

Ga. Code Ann. § 34-91(4)(Year)("'Injury' and
'personal injury' shall not
include injury caused by
the willful act of a third
person directed against an
employee for reasons
personal to such
employee;" therefore,
claims arising from such
actions are not covered
by the statute and are
accordingly not barred by
the exclusivity
provision.).

Baldwin v. Roberts, 442 S.E.2d
272, 273-74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding employee's claim against
employer for battery when
employer struck employee as
employee was being escorted
from restaurant by police was
barred because alleged battery
was related to employment and
therefore covered by the
exclusivity provision of workers'
compensation.) See also 12 Ga.
Jur. Workers' Compensation § 4:6
Purely Personal Willful and
Intentional Acts.

Florida

Georgia
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Hawaii

Exception limited
to claims for
sexual
harassment,
sexual assault,
invasion of
privacy related to
sexual harassment
or sexual assault,
and negligent or
intentional
infliction of
emotional distress.

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-5
(Year) (providing
exclusive remedy "except
for sexual harassment or
sexual assault and
infliction of emotional
distress or invasion of
privacy related thereto, in
which case a civil action
may also be brought").

Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson
Quinn & Stifel, 176 P.3d 91, 108
(Haw. 2008) ("Based on a plain
reading, HRS § 386-5
unambiguously provides that
claims for infliction of emotional
distress or invasion of privacy are
not subject to the exclusivity
provision when such claims arise
from claims for sexual harassment
or sexual assault, in which case a
civil action may be brought.").
See also 29 U. Haw. L. Rev. 211,
Hawai'i's Workers' Compensation
Scheme: An Employer's License
to Kill? (questioning the limited
exception to exclusivity provided
in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-5
(Year)).

Idaho

Wilful Physical
Aggression

Idaho Code Ann. § 72209 (providing that claim
is not barred "where the
injury or death is
proximately caused by
the wilful or unprovoked
physical aggression of the
employer").

Illinois

Purpose/Specific
Intent (Judicial)

820 Ill. Comp. Stat.
305/11 (exclusive
remedy).

Kearney v. Denker, 760 P.2d
1171, 1173 (Idaho 1988) (internal
citation omitted) ("The word
'aggression' connotes 'an offensive
action' such as an 'overt hostile
attack.' To prove aggression there
must be evidence of some
offensive action or hostile attack.
It is not sufficient to prove that
the alleged aggressor committed
negligent acts that made it
substantially certain that injury
would occur.").
Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 569
N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991) (holding that an employee
must “allege defendants had the
specific intent to injure . . .”
Allegations that the defendant
“possessed a substantial certainty
that injury would occur” is
insufficient.).
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Indiana

Purpose/Specific
Intent (Judicial)

Ind. Code § 22-3-26 (year) (exclusive
remedy).

Iowa

*best guessguess- intentional
torts only
exception (assault,
battery, ect.)

Iowa Code § 85.20
(Year) (exclusive
remedy).

Kansas

*No exception

Kan. Stat. Ann. §
44-5a07 (exclusive
remedy).

Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 637
N.E.2d 1271, 1275, n.5 (Ind. 1994)
(rejecting outright the substantial
certainty standard and holding that
"nothing short of deliberate intent to
inflict an injury, or actual knowledge
that an injury is certain to occur, will
suffice"); Eichstadt v. Frisch's
Restaurants, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 1207,
1210-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)(internal
citations omitted)("Before an injury can
be said to have been intended by an
employer, two requirements must be
met. First, the employer itself must
have intended the injury . . . Second,the
employer must have intended the injury
or had actual knowledge that an injury
was certain to occur.").
Brcka v. St. Paul Travelers Companies,
Inc., 366 F.Supp.2d 850, 855 (S.D.Iowa
2005)("Unlike simple dissatisfaction of
care claims or negligence actions,
intentional torts do not fall within the
exclusive remedy provision."); Beard v.
Flying J, Inc. 266 F.3d 792 C.A.8
(Iowa),2001.
Tomlinson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 770 P.2d 833, 838 (Kan.
1989)(quoting Hormann v. New
Hampshire Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 837,
pincite (Kan. 1984)(“'As a general rule,
exclusive of exceptions created in the
Act itself, the Kansas Act's operation is
exclusive of all other remedy and
liability. Kansas cases have followed
the principle that if the Kansas
Workmen's Compensation Act affords
the worker a remedy for the wrong, the
compensation Act is exclusive, thus
barring an independent tort action at
common law.'”); Dillard v. Strecker,
877 P.2d 371, 374 (Kan. 1994)(citation
omitted)("[T]he provisions of the Act
are to be liberally construed to bring
workers under the Act whether or not it
is desirable for the specific individual's
circumstance.").
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State

Approach

Statute

Kentucky

*Wilful Physical
Aggression (may
only be an
exception for
wilfull acts of
employee not
employer).

Louisiana

Substantial
Certainty
(Judicial)

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 342.690 (West
Year)(exclusivity
"shall not apply in
any case where the
injury or death is
proximately caused
by the willful and
unprovoked
physical aggression
of such employee,
officer or
director")(emphasis
added).
La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 23:1032(A)-(B)
(establishing
workers'
compensation as the
exclusive remedy
except for
intentional acts).

Maine

No Exception for
Intentional Torts

Me. Rev. Stat. tit.
39, §§ 104, 408.

Maryland

Purpose/Specific
Intent (Statutory)

Md. Code Ann.,
Labor § 9-509
(West Year)
(Establishing
exception if
employee shows
"deliberate intent of
the employer to
injure or kill the
covered
employee").
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Case Law

Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 481
(La. 1981) ("The meaning of 'intent' is
that the person who acts either (1)
consciously desires the physical result
of his act, whatever the likelihood of
that result happening from his conduct;
or (2) knows that that result is
substantially certain to follow from his
conduct, whatever his desire may be as
to that result.").
Frank v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 352 F.Supp.2d
8, 11 (D.Me. 2005) ("Maine courts have
held that this exemption [from tort
liability] applies not only to negligence,
but to intentional torts as well." Li v.
C.N. Brown Co., 645 A.2d 606, 608
(Me. 1994) ("The workers'
compensation statute no longer requires
injuries to have been accidental to fall
within the scope of the Act. See, e.g.,
P.L.1973, ch. 389 (legislature deleted
the words “by accident” from the
statute). The Act applies to all workrelated injuries and deaths, however
caused, not just accidental injuries and
deaths.").
Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of
Delmarva, Inc., 503 A.2d 708, 712
(Md. 1984) ("To bypass the exclusivity
provided by a workmen’s compensation
statute such as ours, the complaint must
be based upon allegations of an
intentional or deliberate act by the
employer with a desire to bring about
the consequences of the act.”).
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Massachusetts

*No exception for
intentional torts of
employer as long
as tort arises out
of employment
relationship.

Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 152, § 24
(Year)(exclusive
remedy).

Michigan

Purpose/Specific
Intent (Statutory)

Minnesota

Purpose/Specific
Intent (Judicial)

Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 418.131 (Year)
("The only
exception to this
exclusive remedy is
an intentional tort.
An intentional tort
shall exist only
when an employee
is injured as a result
of a deliberate act
of the employer and
the employer
specifically
intended an injury.
An employer shall
be deemed to have
intended to injure if
the employer had
actual knowledge
that an injury was
certain to occur and
willfully
disregarded that
knowledge.").
Minn. Stat. §
176.031 ("The
liability of an
employer
prescribed by this
chapter is exclusive
and in the place of
any other liability to
such employee.").

Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664
N.E.2d 815, 818 (Mass. 1996)(stating
that "[e]xcept for certain exceptions . . .
intentional torts are covered by the
workers' compensation act" and are
therefore subject to the exclusivity
provision); Fusaro v. Blakely, 661
N.E.2d 1339, 1341 (Mass. App. Ct.
1996)("A claim against a fellow worker
for the commission of an intentional
tort will be barred by the exclusivity
clause of the Workers' Compensation
Act, G.L. c. 152, § 24, if committed
within the course of the worker's
employment and in furtherance of the
employer's interest.").
Smith v. Mirror Lite Co., 492 N.W.2d
744, 746 n. 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
("1987 P.A. 28 amended the exclusive
remedy provision of the WDCA.
Before the amendment, whether a tort
was intentional was determined by
applying the ‘substantial certainty’
standard, whether the employer
intended the act that caused the injury
and knew that the injury was
substantially certain to occur.").
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Gunderson v. Harrington, 632 N.W.2d
695, 703 (Minn. 2001) (requiring a
"conscious and deliberate intent to
inflict injury" for exception to apply;
knowledge to a substantial certainty is
insufficient).
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Mississippi

Purpose/Specific
Intent (Judicial)

Miss. Code Ann. §
71-3-9 (exclusive
remedy).

Missouri

*No Exception for
Intentional,
Unprovoked Acts
of Violence
(Statutory);
Possible
Exception for
Purpose/Specific
Intent to Injure.

Montana

Purpose/Specific
Intent (Statutory)

Mo. Rev. Stat. §
287.120(1)
(Providing
exclusive remedy
"for personal injury
or death of the
employee by
accident arising out
of and in the course
of the employee's
employment" and
explaining that
"'accident' as used
in this section shall
include, but not be
limited to, injury or
death of the
employee caused by
the unprovoked
violence or assault
against the
employee by any
person").
Mont. Code Ann. §
39-71-413(1),(3)
(year) (establishing
an exception to
exclusivity for an
intentional injury
and defining
intentional injury as
"an injury caused
by an intentional
and deliberate act
that is specifically
and actually
intended to cause
injury to the
employee injured
and there is actual
knowledge that an
injury is certain to
occur").

Franklin Corp. v. Tedford, 18 So.3d
215, 221 (Miss. 2009) (internal citation
omitted) ("Mississippi is in concurrence
with an overwhelming majority of
states in requiring an 'actual intent to
injure' the employee.").
McCoy v. Liberty Foundry Co., 635
S.W.2d 60, 62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(“[F]or employer conduct to be
actionable as a ‘nonaccidental’ cause of
injury, the employer must intentionally
act with the specific purpose of thereby
injuring the employee."). But see
Massey v. Victor L. Phillips, Co. 827
F.Supp. 597, 599 (W.D.Mo.1993)
("Thus, Missouri courts appear
undaunted by the fact that the injury in
question is the result of obviously
intentional acts . . . In the court's view,
these cases bring into doubt the
continuing validity of McCoy and
similar decisions.).
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Alexander v. Bozeman Motors, Inc.,
234 P.3d 880, 886 (Mont. 2010) ("In
other words, an 'intentional injury' has
two required elements: (1) an
intentional and deliberate act
specifically and actually intended to
cause injury; and (2) actual knowledge
of the injury's certainty.").
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Nebraska

No Exception for
Intentional Torts of
Employer (Judicial)

Harsh Intern., Inc. v. Monfort
Industries, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 574, 579
(Neb. 2003).
(internal citation omitted) ("We have
stated that the Act provides the
exclusive remedy by the employee
against the employer for any injury
arising out of and in the course of the
employment. Thus, we have held that
intentional acts of an employer fall
within the scope of the Act."

Nevada

Purpose/Specific
Intent

Neb. Rev. Stat. §
48-111 (year)
("exemption given
an employee,
officer, or director
of an employer or
insurer shall not
apply in any case
when the injury or
death is proximately
caused by the
willful and
unprovoked
physical aggression
of such employee,
officer, or
director")(emphasis
added)
Nev. Rev. Stat. §
616B.612 (year)
(exclusive remedy).

New
Hampshire

No Exception for
Intentional Torts of
Employer
(Statutory/Judicial)

N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 281-A:8
(providing that
employee's are
presumed "to have
waived all rights of
action whether at
common law or by
statute or provided
under the laws of
any other state or
otherwise: (a)
Against the
employer . . . and
(b) Except for
intentional torts,
against any officer,
director, agent,
servant or employee
acting on behalf of
the employer").

Karch v. BayBank FSB, 794 A.2d 763,
770 (N.H. 2002.) (emphasis added)
("An employee is entitled to
compensation under the Workers'
Compensation Law for ‘accidental
injury or death arising out of and in the
course of employment,’ RSA 281-A:2,
XI, but may not bring a separate tort
action against her employer. Indeed, the
Workers' Compensation Law expressly
provides that an employee subject to
that chapter waives the right to bring
such a separate action in exchange for
the acceptance of benefits. RSA 281A:8, I(a). We note, however, an
employee's waiver in exchange for
benefits does not bar intentional tort
actions against co-employees. RSA
281-A:8, I(b).").
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King v. Penrod Drilling Co., 652
F.Supp. 1331,1334 (D. Nev. 1987)
(requiring "deliberate intent to injure
the employee").
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

New Jersey

Substantial
Certainty
(Judicial);
May
Require
Virtual
Certainty

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-8
(exclusive remedy "except
for intentional wrong").

New Mexico

3-Prong
Delgado
Claim: Less
Exacting
Standard
than
Substantial
Certainty

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-16(E) (1978) (exclusive
remedy).

New York

*Not surecase makes
it sound like
substantial
certainty
but I wrote
down true
intent in
notes…
check case.

N.Y. Workers'
Compensation Law § 11
(McKinney Year) (The
employee must prove that
the employer's acts were
deliberate and intentional,
not merely reckless. Injury
resulting from the
employer's negligence or
recklessness are not
exceptions to the exclusive
liability rule . . . there must
be proof that there was a
specific act, or acts,
directed at causing harm to
the claimant, to take away
the defense of workers'
compensation as the
exclusive remedy of the
employee against the
employer or coemployee.").

Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co.,
Inc., 790 A.2d 884, 894 (2002)
(explaining the Millison two-prong
intentional wrong analysis: (1) conduct:
subjectively intended to injure or
substantially certain to injure (2)
context: "the resulting injury and the
circumstances of its infliction on the
worker must be (a) more than a fact of
life of industrial employment and (b)
plainly beyond anything the Legislature
intended the Workers' Compensation
Act to immunize"); See also Van Dunk
v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp., 2
A.3d 456 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010); Millison v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505, 514
(N.J. 1985) ("We must demand a virtual
certainty.").
Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc.,
34 P.3d 1148, 1156 (N.M. 2001)
(articulating 3 prong test: "(1) the
worker or employer engages in an
intentional act or omission, without just
cause or excuse, that is reasonably
expected to result in the injury suffered
by the worker; (2) the worker or
employer expects the intentional act or
omission to result in the injury, or has
utterly disregarded the consequences;
and (3) the intentional act or omission
proximately causes the injury").
Acevedo v. Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y., Inc., 596 N.Y.S.2d 68, 71 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993) (internal quotations
and citations omitted)("To sufficiently
plead an intentional tort that will
neutralize the statute's exclusivity there
must be alleged an intentional or
deliberate act by the employer directed
at causing harm to the particular
employee. In order to constitute an
intentional tort, the conduct must be
engaged in with the desire to bring
about the consequences of the act. A
mere knowledge and appreciation of a
risk is not the same as the intent to
cause injury ... A result is intended if
the act is done with the purpose of
accomplishing such a result or with
knowledge that to a substantial
certainty such a result will ensue.").
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

North
Carolina

Substantial
Certainty
(Judicial);
Woodson
Claim

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-9
(exclusive remedy).

North Dakota

Purpose/
Specific
Intent
(Judicial)

N.D. Cent. Code § 65-0428 (exclusive remedy).

Ohio

Purpose/
Specific
Intent
(Statute
uses
"substantial
certainty"
language
but defines
in a way so
that only
purpose/
specific
intent is
sufficient to
get claim
within
exception)

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2745.01(A),(B) (West
Year) (providing
exception if "the employer
committed the tortious act
with intent to injure
another or with the belief
that the injury was
substantially certain to
occur. (B) As used in this
section, “substantially
certain” means that an
employer acts with
deliberate intent to cause
an employee to suffer an
injury, a disease, a
condition, or death.

Seymour v. Lenoir County, 567 S.E.2d
799, 801 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting
Woodson v. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222,
228 (N.C. 1991) ("Under a Woodson
claim, a plaintiff can bring a civil suit
against an employer based on
intentional acts where 'an employer
intentionally engages in misconduct
knowing it is substantially certain to
cause serious injury or death to
employees and an employee is injured
or killed by that misconduct.'").
Zimmerman v. Valdak Corp., 570
N.W.2d 204, 209 (N.D. 1997)(check
name of case) (rejecting the substantial
certainty standard outright and holding
that “[a]n employer is deemed to have
intended to injure if the employer had
knowledge an injury was certain to
occur and willfully disregarded that
knowledge”).
Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co.,
927 N.E.2d 1066, 1079 (Ohio 2010)
(internal quotation and citation omitted)
("When we consider the definition of
‘substantial certainty,’ it becomes
apparent that an employee does not
have two ways to prove an intentional
tort claim as R.C. 2745.01(A) suggests.
The employee's two options of proof
become: (1) the employer acted with
intent to injure or (2) the employer
acted with deliberate intent to injure.
Thus, under R.C. 2745.01, the only way
an employee can recover is if the
employer acted with the intent to cause
injury.").
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Oklahoma

Purpose/
Specific
Intent
(Statutory)

Parret v. Unicco, 2005 OK 54, ¶ 2, 127
P.3d 572 (overturned by 85 Okla. Stat. 12.

Oregon

Purpose/
Specific
Intent
(Statutory)

Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 12
(year) (change formatOLR does diff)
(exclusive remedy
"except in the case of
an intentional tort."
Specifies that an
intentional tort “exist[s]
only when the
employee is injured as a
result of willful,
deliberate, specific
intent of the employer
to cause such injury.”
A plaintiff’s successful
demonstration “that the
employer had
knowledge that such
injury was substantially
certain to result from its
conduct” is insufficient.
Or. Rev. Stat. §
656.156(2) (Year) ("If
injury or death results
to a worker from the
deliberate intention of
the employer of the
worker to produce such
injury or death, the
worker, the widow,
widower, child or
dependent of the
worker may take under
this chapter, and also
have cause for action
against the employer, as
if such statutes had not
been passed, for
damages over the
amount payable under
those statutes.").
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Lusk v. Monaco Motor Homes, Inc., 775
P.2d 891, 894 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (“The
statutory exemption applies only if the
injury results ‘from the deliberate
intention of the employer of the worker to
produce such injury . . .' That phrase
requires, in addition to the intent that will
normally suffice to prove an intentional
tort, that the injury be ‘deliberate,’ in the
sense that the employer has had an
opportunity to weigh the consequences
and to make a conscious choice among
possible courses of action, and also that
the employer specifically intend ‘to
produce * * * injury’ to someone,
although not necessarily to the particular
employe[e] who was injured.").
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Pensylvania

No
Exception
for
Intentional
Torts of
Employer
(Judicial)

77 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 481
(Year) (The liability of
an employer under this
act shall be exclusive
and in place of any and
all other liability to
such employe[e]s.")

Rhode Island

No
Exception
for
Intentional
Torts of
Employer
(Judicial)

R.I. Gen. Laws § 2829-20 (exclusive
remedy).

Barber v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 555
A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 1989) ("The
significance of this provision indicates that
the legislature, in its grant of immunity to
fellow employees, expressly excluded
intentional misconduct. However, in the
immunity provided for the employer,
under section 303 of the ODA no such
exception was engrafted. This omission
cannot be lightly ignored. It is obvious that
the legislature considered the issue of
intentional torts and created an exception
to the statutory immunity when intentional
harm was caused by the co-employee. The
legislature's failure to provide a similar
exclusion to the immunity provided for the
employer must be deemed to have been
deliberate."); Holdampf v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co. of N.Y., 793 F.Supp. 111, 113 (W.D.
Pa. 1992)("In Poyser v. Newman & Co.,
514 Pa. 32, 522 A.2d 548, 550 (1987), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court definitively
held that the intentional tort exception to
the exclusivity provision, to the extent that
it was ever alive in Pennsylvania, was now
dead. The court explained and reaffirmed
this holding in Barber v. Pittsburgh
Corning Corp., 521 Pa. 29, 555 A.2d 766,
770 (1989) ('In this Court's decision in
Poyser, supra, we expressly held ... that
there was no intentional tort exception to
the exclusivity provision of the WCA.'").
Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 790 A.2d
368, 372 (R.I. 2002) ("As both sides note
in their briefs, this Court repeatedly has
held that there is no wholesale intentionaltort exception to the exclusive-remedy
doctrine, as codified in § 28-29-20. Thus,
the WCA provides the exclusive remedy
for work-related personal injuries “under
chapters 29-38 of this title [28]”-even if
the injury-causing conduct of the alleged
tortfeasor was intentional."); Diaz v.
Darmet Corp., 694 A.2d 736, 737 (R.I.
1997) ("[I]n Rhode Island neither the
Legislature nor this court has created an
intentional tort exception to the mandate
of § 28-29-20.").
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

South
Carolina

Purpose/
Specific
Intent
(Judicial)

S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1540 (1976) (exclusive
remedy).

South Dakota

Substantial
Certainty
(Judicial)

S.D. Codified Laws §
62-3-1; 62-3-2
(providing exclusive
liability for employer
and remedy for
employee, respectively,
"except rights and
remedies arising from
intentional tort").

Peay v. U.S. Silica Co., 437 S.E.2d 64, 6566 (S.C. 1993)(Explicitly rejecting the
substantial certainty standard and holding
"that only those injuries inflicted by an
employer who acts with a deliberate or
specific intent to injure are exempted from
the exclusive remedy of workers'
compensation coverage").
Jensen v. Sport Bowl, Inc., 469 N.W.2d
370, 372 (S.D. 1991) (holding the injured
employee "must also allege facts that
plausibly demonstrate an actual intent by
the employer to injure or a substantial
certainty that injury will be the inevitable
outcome of the employer's conduct").

Tennessee

Purpose/
Specific
Intent

Tenn. Code Ann. § 506-108 (exclusive
remedy).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss1/3

Bishop v. Woodbury Clinical Laboratory,
Inc., Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1609949 (M.D.
Tenn. 2010)(citing Gonzales v. Alman
Constr. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1993)) ("Tennessee law does
recognize an exception to this exclusive
remedy provision in instances where the
employer acts with 'actual intent to injure'
the employee.").
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Texas

Substantial
Certainty

Urdiales v. Concord Technologies
Delaware, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 400, 406-07
(Tex. App. 2003) (inteneral quotations and
citations omitted) ("Mere negligence or
willful negligence will not suffice because
the specific intent to inflict injury is
lacking. 'Intent' means the actor desires to
cause [the] consequences of his act, or that
he believes that the consequences are
substantially certaint to result from it.").

Utah

Purpose/
Specific
Intent
(Judicial)

Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §
408.001(B) (West
Year) (check cite
because of new code)
(exclusive remedy
except allows suit for
"exemplary damages
by the surviving
spouse or heirs of the
body of a deceased
employee whose death
was caused by an
intentional act or
omission of the
employer or by the
employer's gross
negligence"); Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. §
41.001(11) defines
"gross negligence" to
mean "an act or
omission: (A) which
when viewed
objectively from the
standpoint of the actor
at the time of its
occurrence involves
an extreme degree of
risk, considering the
probability and
magnitude of the
potential harm to
others; and (B) of
which the actor has
actual, subjective
awareness of the risk
involved, but
nevertheless proceeds
with conscious
indifference to the
rights, safety, or
welfare of others.
Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-105 (West
Year)(exclusive
remedy).
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Thomas v. National Semiconductor, Inc.,
827 F.Supp. 1550, 1552 (D. Utah
1993)(requiring a showing of "deliberate
intent directed to the purpose of inflicting
an injury"); Cerka v. Salt Lake County
988 F.Supp. 1420, 1422 (D. Utah 1997)
(quoting Lantz v. National Semiconductor
Corp., 775 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah Ct. App.
1989))("[F]or a defendant to be held liable
for an 'intentional act,' she must have
'manifested a deliberate intent to injure.'").
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Vermont

Purpose/
Specific
Intent; But
Supreme
Court has left
the door open
to the
possibility of
adopting the
substantial
certainty
standard.

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §
622 (exclusive
remedy).

Virginia

Purpose/
Specific
Intent
(Judicial)

Va. Code Ann. § 65.2307 (Year)(exclusive
remedy).

Washington

Purpose/
Specific
Intent: 2
prong Birklid
test

Wash. Rev. Code §
51.24.020 (Year) ("If
injury results to a
worker from the
deliberate intention of
his or her employer to
produce such injury,
the worker or
beneficiary of the
worker shall have the
privilege to take under
this title and also have
cause of action against
the employer as if this
title had not been
enacted, for any
damages in excess of
compensation and
benefits paid or
payable under this
title.").

Kittell v. Vermont Weatherboard, Inc.,
417 A.2d 926, 927 (Vt. 1980)("Nothing
short of a specific intent to injure falls
outside the scope of the Act."). But see
Garger v. Desroches, 974 A.2d 597, 602
n.3 (Vt. 2009)(citing Mead v. Western
Slate, Inc., 848 A.2d 257 (Vt.
2004))(declining to address "whether the
broadened definition of specific intent
identified in Mead [which includes
substantial certainty] should be adopted"
because the plaintiff did "not allege[] that
defendant knew with substantial certainty
that injury would result."
McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments,
Inc., 690 F.Supp. 468, 468 (E.D. Va.
1988)("Thus where an employer commits
an intentional tort with the intent to injure
an employee, this Court concludes that an
action by that employee is not barred by
the WCA.").
Birklid v. Boeing Co., 904 P.2d 278, 285
(Wash. 1995)(rejecting outright the
substantial certainty standard and holding
that "the phrase 'deliberate intention' in
RCW 51.24.020 means the employer [(1)]
had actual knowledge that an injury was
certain to occur and [(2)] willfully
disregarded that knowledge").

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss1/3
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Washington,
D.C.

Purpose/Specific
Intent (Judicial)

D.C. Code § 32-1504 (Year)
(exclusive remedy).

Grillo v. National Bank of
Washington, 540 A.2d
743, 744 (D.C. 1988)("We
hold that only injuries
specifically intended by the
employer to be inflicted on
the particular employee
who is injured fall outside
of the exclusivity
provisions of the WCA and
that the evidence presented
to show the employer's
knowledge with substantial
certainty that an injury will
result from an act does not
equate with the specific
intent to injure or kill when
the injury is caused by the
intentional act of a third
person."); Feirson v.
District of Columbia, 506
F.3d 1063, 1068 (D.C.
2007) (citing Grillo v.
National Bank of
Washington, 540 A.2d
743, 744 (D.C. 1988))
("Grillo recognized an
intentional injury
exception to the District's
Workers' Compensation
Act (WCA), which applies
only when the employer
specifically intended to
injure the employee.").
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State

Approach

Statute

West Virginia

Akin to
Substantial
Certainty
(specific intent or
5 statutory
requirements)

W. Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)
(2002) (fix quotes) (providing
exception to exclusivity if
employer acted with the
"diliberate intention" to cause
injury. (stating standard of
"deliberate intention" may only be
met if: (1) the employer "acted
with a consciously, subjectively
and deliberately formed intention
to produce the specific result of
injury or death to an employee.
This standard requires a showing
of an actual, specific intent . . . or"
(2) all of the following five (5)
conditions are satisfied: (A) That
a specific unsafe working
condition existed in the workplace
which presented a high degree of
risk and a strong probability of
serious injury or death; (B) That
the employer, prior to the injury,
had actual knowledge of the
existence of the specific unsafe
working condition and of the high
degree of risk and the strong
probability of serious injury or
death presented by the specific
unsafe working condition; (C) the
specific unsafe working condition
was a violation of a state or
federal safety law or of a
commonly accepted and wellknown safety standard within the
industry or business of the
employer; (D) the employer
intentionally exposed an
employee to the specific unsafe
working condition; and (E) the
specific unsafe working condition
proximately caused a
compensable injury.
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State

Approach

Statute

Case Law

Wisconsin

No
Exception
for
Intentional
Torts of
Employer
(Judicial)

Wis. Stat § 102.03(2)
("Where such
conditions exist the
right to the recovery of
compensation under
this chapter shall be the
exclusive remedy
against the employer,
any other employee of
the same employer and
the worker's
compensation insurance
carrier. This section
does not limit the right
of an employee to bring
action against any
coemployee for an
assault intended to
cause bodily harm.")

Wyoming

No
Exception
for
Intentional
Torts of
Employer
(Judicial)

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2714-104(a) (providing
exclusive remedy
"unless the employees
intentionally act to
cause physical harm or
injury to the injured
employee.") (emphasis
added).

Rivera v. Safford, 377 N.W.2d 187, 189
(Wis. Ct. App. 1985) ("The Worker's
Compensation Act, ch. 102, Stats.,
provides an exclusive remedy against the
employer or a coemployee to an employee
who is injured while performing service
growing out of and incidental to his or her
employment, where the accident causing
the injury arises out of his or her
employment. Sec. 102.03(1)(c), (1)(e), and
(2), Stats.; Goranson v. DILHR, 94 Wis.2d
537, 549, 289 N.W.2d 270, 276
(1980) (citation omitted). An employee,
however, may bring an action against a
coemployee for an assault intended to
cause bodily harm.Sec. 102.03(2).");
Aslakson v. Gallagher Bassett Services,
Inc., 729 N.W.2d 712 (Wis 2007)(See
alsoGuse v. A.O. Smith Corp., 260 Wis.
403, 406-07, 51 N.W.2d 24 (1952) (“In
enacting the Act, the legislature intended
to impose upon employers an absolute
liability, regardless of fault; and in return
for this burden, intended to grant
employers immunity from all tort liability
on account of injuries to employees.”);
Vick v. Brown, 38 N.W.2d 716, 719
(1949) ( “[The employer's liability] is
solely under the workmen's compensation
law. There is no liability in tort.”).
Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687
P.2d 885, 888-89 (Wyo. 1984)(internal
citation and quotations omitted)(holding
that employer's enjoy "absolute immunity
from tort actions including the employer's
violation of his duty of care whether the
negligence is ordinary or culpable . . .
[t]his is to say that immunity is
absolute . . . Our various interpretations of
§ 27-12-103(a), W.S.1977, reflect the
absolute immunity afforded contributing
employers under the worker's
compensation laws of Wyoming.").
Parker v. Energy Development Co., 691
P.2d 981, 985 (Wyo. 1984)(holding an
employer "is absolutely immune from all
common-law tort remedies arising out of
the injury to or death of the employeeincluding causes of action for intentional
tort or culpable negligence").
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